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
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ALLEN WELSH DULLES  
AS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
26 FEBRUARY 1953 - 29 NOVEMBER 1961

VOLUME I ALLEN DULLES, THE MAN

DCI-2



by

Wayne G. Jackson

HISTORICAL STAFF  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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### Foreword

This is the third volume in the DCI Historical Series that the Central Intelligence Agency has declassified and transferred to the National Archives for release to the public under the CIA Historical Review Program. Since the previous volume in this series, General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence, was released in late 1990 the Historical Review Program has been greatly expanded under the "Openness Program," which Director Robert Gates first announced in February 1992, and which his successor, R. James Woolsey, has reaffirmed and continued since taking office in February 1993. In 1992 the Center for the Study of Intelligence was reorganized to include the History Staff, first formed in 1951, and a new Historical Review Group, which has greatly extended the scope and accelerated the pace of the program to declassify historical records that former Director William J. Casey established in 1985.

Wayne Gridley Jackson completed this study of Allen Dulles's tenure as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in July 1973. Parts I through IV of the manuscript were originally classified Secret, and part V was originally Top Secret. Born in Lucerne, Switzerland, in 1905, Wayne Jackson graduated from the Episcopal High School, Alexandria, Virginia in 1922, took a B.S. from Haverford College in 1926, and an LL.B. from Yale Law School in 1929. A member of the New York law firm, Carter, Ledyard & Milburn, from 1929 to 1941, he served in the Department of State and elsewhere during World War II. As he notes in his Preface, Jackson left State in 1951 to serve as Special Assistant to Allen Dulles, who was then Deputy Director for Plans (i.e. clandestine operations). After serving as Special Assistant to the DCI for both Walter Bedell Smith and Allen Dulles, he was detailed in January 1956 to the White House to work with William H. Jackson, President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Returning to CIA in January 1957, Jackson was a member of the Board of National Estimates until he retired in January 1969. After his retirement he wrote this present history under contract to the CIA History Staff.

In his engaging Preface Wayne Jackson explains how he approached this study of Allen Dulles as DCI, which was originally intended only for use inside the Agency. In spite of his diffidence, he offers an admirably balanced and fair-minded treatment of this major figure in CIA's history. We are glad that we can now present Wayne Jackson's account of Allen Dulles and his CIA to the American public.

J. Kenneth McDonald  
Chief Historian

May 1994

~~SECRET~~Preface

Allen Welsh Dulles was a vital, vivid man who took part personally in so many of the Agency's activities -- and so much happened between February 1953 and November 1961 -- that an author could be overwhelmed by the task of writing about his role as Director of Central Intelligence. It is possible to emphasize the specific activities of Dulles during the period -- what he did with his time -- but such an approach would distort the record. He was fascinated by the operations of the clandestine services, particularly the political and psychological activities that are generally known as covert action. He spent a disproportionate amount of time in being a super case officer on individual projects. He spent hours on what might be called public relations matters -- talking to visitors, filling speaking engagements and corresponding with a multitude of friends. Yet he would have been the first to say that there was no necessary correlation between the hours he devoted to specific items and their importance to the Agency or to his mission

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of making the CIA the best intelligence service in the world.

The scheme which was adopted in writing this history was developed in the course of answering two questions: What is its audience? and what is the purpose to be served? Since this history was to be written from the point of view of the Director's office, it was assumed that the audience would be interested in the responsibilities of a Director, such as a prospective new Director, Deputy Director, or Executive Director. The history was designed for internal CIA use only, and classification and sensitivity were not to be barriers in choosing the material to be included. The writer was told that the main purpose of the whole historical project was to record a sort of collective memory of the Agency for use within CIA. Thus it appeared to the writer that the most valid approach would be to discuss the kinds of problems that Dulles dealt with during his years as Director, to show the way he handled them and, to the extent possible, to indicate why he acted as he did. This approach would not result in chronological history; it would of

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necessity be episodic, and very selective. It could, however, provide useful guidance to senior Agency officers in the future, since many of the situations which Dulles faced are typical of those any Director would have to deal with.

Shortly after Dulles retired in 1961, I asked him if he would be willing to tape-record an account of the salient incidents of his career including his years in CIA. I had discussed this matter in the Agency, particularly with L. B. Kirkpatrick, then Executive Director. The idea had been enthusiastically received, and I was offered full support and technical facilities such as recording equipment and personnel, the help of the Historical Staff in producing papers, and topics for discussion. I felt that my relations with Dulles were on a basis of sufficient confidence that I could ask questions on sensitive subjects and get answers. He responded positively to this proposal and said that as soon as he had *The Craft of Intelligence* out of the way, he would begin taping. Whether or not he really meant what he said, I do not know; the fact is that nothing ever happened.

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Once when I was talking to him about this taping project, the subject of his relations with Senator McCarthy was raised. He said he would like to get copies of his correspondence with McCarthy from the Agency files. Colonel White procured them and I delivered them to him. That was the end of the incident. At another time, he was talking about his desire to write something about General William Donovan, whom he admired and considered to be the father of American intelligence. In this connection he said that he wanted to interview the retired journalist, Edgar Ansel Mowrer, whom Donovan had dispatched on a sort of intelligence mission to the Far East in 1941. He thought of the taping technique and asked if I could arrange this. It seemed like a good chance to demonstrate how easy the procedure would be. Technicians came to his house and installed the taping equipment and table microphones. At his request, I was present during the interview. The tape was transcribed by the Agency and given to him. It had all been easy and simple. But that was the only time taping was done.

Although I often urged him to begin, he always

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found some excuse not to. I was not alone in believing that it was important that he tape his recollections. Mrs. Dulles pressed him -- as did Frank G. Wisner, Desmond FitzGerald, and James Hunt among others -- but he never would set a time. In his last years he would say, "I am too old, I have forgotten so much." The day after he died, Mrs. Dulles said to me in substance, "It's too bad Allen would never let you tape him. He was always opposed to writing his memoirs, though we urged him to." What motivated his reluctance I do not know. He had a rich and fascinating life; he could have told it well.

Finally, it should be noted that Allen Dulles did not leave systematic files or records of his administration. The writer, at the request of Mrs. Dulles and the Agency, shortly after Dulles's death went over all his files in his house. The primary purpose was to sort out those that contained classified or otherwise sensitive documents, which, it was agreed between the Agency and the estate, should be held in the Agency's custody. Although there were a number of documents, relatively few were important

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and these were miscellaneous in nature, following no clear pattern.

Dulles's office diaries and calendars were not helpful since they consisted mainly of short notations of the names of people seen, who had called him, what appointments had been made, and the like, with no reference to substance. Although he frequently made memoranda of conversations and meetings, he usually sent them on to the components of the Agency most directly concerned, and there is no collection of them in one place; they turn up in the widest variety of files and archives. His was not an orderly way of doing business; it is a reflection of his close and intimate relation with the people in CIA that there is no collected record of what he did with his days.

In writing this history, I have attempted to be objective. I may not have succeeded. In January 1951, when Allen Dulles became the Deputy Director for Plans, he had no staff. I was in the State Department and was recruited by my old friend, William H. Jackson, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, to transfer to CIA to work for Dulles. This assignment lasted only

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a short time, inasmuch as I was sidelined by illness for more than a year. I returned to CIA and worked as an assistant for the Director of Central Intelligence, General Walter Bedell Smith, for some months, but was again required by health to rusticate until the fall of 1953. By then, Dulles had succeeded Smith as DCI. From the fall of 1953 until the spring of 1956, I was a special assistant to Dulles, handling Operations Coordination Board (OCB) and NSC 5412 matters as my principal assignments. In March 1956, William H. Jackson became President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for Psychological Operations and later for National Security Affairs. He asked Dulles to detail me to his staff. Dulles asked me to take this job, although I was not anxious to do so. In early 1957, I returned to CIA as a member of the Board of National Estimates, a position which I held until my retirement in January 1969.

During the years that I worked directly for Dulles, my contacts with him were constant, and there developed a relationship of warm friendship on both sides. The friendship continued after the close professional relationship had diminished and endured

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after Dulles's retirement until his death. It may not be possible to achieve objectivity when writing about a man for whom I felt respect, admiration, and deep affection.

In the course of writing this history I have interviewed and discussed various aspects of Dulles's administration with a large number of men who worked with him. Particular mention should be made of the late General Charles P. Cabell, Dulles's DDCI, who read and commented at length on the sections of this history dealing with coordination. In all cases, not excluding General Cabell, the men I talked to showed great affection and regard for him, and in many cases, their testimony must have been colored by their warm recollections. Those interviewed, aside from General Cabell, include Lawrence K. White (Executive Director), Lawrence R. Houston (General Counsel), John S. Earman (formerly Dulles's Executive Assistant), John A. Bross (formerly D/DCI/NIPE), Robert Amory (formerly DDI), Thomas A. Parrott (Office of D/DCI/NIPE, who formerly handled OCB and NSC 5412 matters for Dulles), Robert Bannerman (formerly DDS), H. Gates Lloyd (formerly

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A/DDS), Sherman Kent (formerly D/NE), Gordon Gray (formerly Special Assistant to President Eisenhower and member of the PBCFIA), James R. Hunt, Gordon Stewart, Kermit Roosevelt, the late C. Tracy Barnes (formerly A/DDP), Richard M. Bissell, Jr. (formerly DDP), Walter Pforzheimer (formerly Legislative Counsel), Livingston T. Merchant (formerly Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and a close friend of John Foster Dulles), and others whose names appear in footnotes.

Wayne G. Jackson

February 1973

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Allen Welsh Dulles

As Director of Central Intelligence

26 February 1953 - 29 November 1961

Volume I Allen Dulles, the Man

Chapter 1

Allen Dulles and His Associates

Allen Welsh Dulles was Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) for almost nine years, years during which the Agency came of age.\* He made a profound imprint on it which persists to this day. Any organization which is headed by a single chief who is responsible for all aspects of its activities, comes to reflect and to be shaped by the personality of that chief. This is particularly true of an organization still in its formative years, when the cement has not yet set. Such was the case with CIA.

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\* For a chronology of the Dulles administration, see Appendix A.

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Its first years under Admiral Hillenkoetter were necessarily tentative, the gathering together of pieces which were to be assembled into an organization of a type which had never before existed in the US Government. Under General Walter Bedell Smith, the organization was filled out and became operational, particularly under the impetus of the Korean War. During the Smith regime various important organizational changes were made, some resulting from the Dulles-Jackson-Correa report.\* These included such major steps as the bringing together and eventual merger of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) and the Office of Special Operations (OSO), the establishment of the Board of National Estimates, and the setting up of the Office of Research and Reports (ORR). It was during the years under Dulles, February 1953 to November 1961, that the Agency matured and its individual style developed.

Allen Dulles was born on 7 April 1893 in Watertown, New York; his parents were the Reverend Allen Macy Dulles, a Presbyterian minister, and Edith Foster Dulles. He graduated from the Auburn (New York) High

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\* See p. 14, below.

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School and, after a year at the Ecole Alsacienne in Paris, took his B.A. at Princeton in 1914 and his M.A. in 1916. He earned his LL.B. at George Washington University in 1926.

Dulles's predecessors as DCI had had at best only limited experience with intelligence. Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers -- the first head of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), the forerunner of CIA set up by President Truman in 1946 -- was a Missouri banker. He had been in the intelligence arm of the Naval Reserve but had been primarily concerned with such things as plant security. He was called to active duty in World War II and sent to Puerto Rico as a security officer. Through his friend, James Forrestal, he was later transferred to the Navy Department and eventually became Deputy Chief of Naval Intelligence under Admiral Inglis. He was most anxious to return to private life at the end of the war and was practically dragooned into the CIG job, which he held only six months until a successor could be found. 1/\* Souers

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\* For serially numbered source references, see Appendix B.

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was succeeded on 10 June 1946 by Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, who had served as Army G-2 for a few months and then took the DCI(CIG) assignment before becoming Chief of Staff of the newly formed independent United States Air Force. Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, the first director of CIA, had been Naval Attache in Paris and Vichy in the early years of the war and had had some experience in organizing intelligence in the Pacific during World War II. None of these men were professional intelligence officers in any broad sense. General Walter Bedell Smith, Dulles's immediate predecessor, had had no intelligence experience when he took office.

In contrast, few other Americans had had so long an experience with intelligence operations, particularly clandestine operations, as Dulles, and few had grown up in an atmosphere in which foreign affairs played so great a role. His grandfather, whom he knew well, had been Secretary of State under President Benjamin Harrison in 1892. Dulles's mother had spent years in foreign capitals when her father, John Foster, had served as US Minister in Mexico, Russia, and Spain.

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Dulles's uncle, Robert Lansing, became Secretary of State under Woodrow Wilson in 1915. This was one year after Dulles had graduated from Princeton and at the time when he was "working his way around the world," as he puts it in the foreword to his book *The Craft of Intelligence*. 2/ During that year he taught school in India and China.

Dulles returned to the United States in 1915 and the following year received his M.A. from Princeton, after which he entered the foreign service. He was assigned to Vienna. When US-Austrian relations were broken in 1917, he was reassigned to Bern. Switzerland was then, during World War I, as it was during World War II, a center for intelligence operations. Dulles served as an intelligence officer operating against the Central Powers, as Germany and its allies were known. After the end of the war, he was assigned to be a member of the US delegation at the Versailles Peace Conference, as was his brother, John Foster Dulles. After that conference, he helped open the US mission in Berlin, served a tour in Constantinople, and came back to the State Department to

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be Chief of the Near Eastern Division. It was during his four years in that post that he also served as a part of the staff of the US observer at a League of Nations disarmament conference in Geneva. In later years, while practicing law in New York, he was a member of several US delegations to disarmament conferences.\*

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\* The writer once asked Dulles how he happened to get involved in the field of disarmament. The story he told is about as follows:

In the early 1920's, when Dulles was Chief of the Near Eastern Division in the State Department, Ethiopia was considered to be in the Near East. One day there arrived in the Department a letter addressed to President Coolidge by Haile Selassie, the young Regent of Ethiopia. He said that he was worried about the safety of his family. He lived in the country and there were roving bands of brigands about. Haile Selassie wanted to have armed bodyguards to protect his family, but he couldn't buy weapons. This was because of an agreement among the European powers and the United States that embargoed the selling of any arms in the Near East. Haile Selassie wanted to know if an exception couldn't be made to this agreement to allow him to buy weapons to protect his family. He enclosed a list of what he wanted -- rifles, machineguns, etc. -- and a check for \$150,000.

As a matter of routine, this letter was referred to Dulles as Chief of the Near Eastern Division. He thought it was a reasonable request and went to see the Secretary, Charles Evans Hughes. The Secretary agreed and told Dulles to try to get the consent of the various powers who were party to the Near East arms embargo agreement. Dulles set out to do so, and in due course got waivers from all of them consenting to the filling of Haile Selassie's order.

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While in the State Department, Dulles attended law school at night at George Washington University.

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Thereafter, through the Army, the order for weapons was filled and they were dispatched to Ethiopia. Haile Selassie was very pleased and sent President Coolidge an effusive letter of thanks and, as a gift, a jeweled sword. This came through Dulles also.

He thought it would be appropriate if Coolidge, in thanking Haile Selassie for the gift, were to send some small gift in return. So he prepared a memorandum from the Secretary to the President to go along with a draft letter of thanks. The memorandum suggested that President Coolidge send Haile Selassie an autographed photograph of himself in a gold frame. Secretary Hughes thought this was appropriate and forwarded the memorandum to Coolidge. In due course, the memorandum was returned to Hughes with the notation, in Coolidge's handwriting, "OK but make it silver."

Sometime later, a communication was received in the Department about a meeting on disarmament in Geneva sponsored by the League of Nations. Since the United States was not a member of the League, it was invited to send an observer. The routing of incoming mail was handled by an office manned (if that's the word) by elderly women who had no substantive functions but who had to review all outgoing documents for form and thus knew who had handled what. There was no office in the Department of State dealing with disarmament, but -- wait -- hadn't young Dulles handled arms for the Regent of Ethiopia and the getting of waivers of the Near East arms embargo? So the invitation was routed to Dulles and, because there was no one else more suitable, he wound up being sent as the junior Department representative to the Geneva talks. Having once had such an assignment, he was tagged with a label and, in later years when he was practicing law, was asked to be a legal advisor to various US delegations to disarmament meetings.

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In 1926, he resigned from the Foreign Service and joined his brother in the prominent New York law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell. It was during his years as a lawyer in New York that he became active in the affairs of the Council on Foreign Relations, an organization of which he was a leading member the rest of his life. He was President of the Council in 1946 and served as a part of the editorial advisory committee of its publication, *Foreign Affairs*, almost until his death.

Dulles was practicing law in New York in 1942 when General William Donovan, the head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), called on him to organize one of the New York offices of OSS, and shortly thereafter he went to Bern as head of the OSS office there. In his book, *Germany's Underground*, Dulles writes:

...the Allied troops had landed in Africa the day before I crossed the Swiss frontier. I was the last American to reach Switzerland legally before the German invasion of southern France cut the Swiss off completely. 3/

This was a highly successful mission -- in the view of many, the best performance of any of Donovan's lieutenants. Many of his accomplishments have become

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public knowledge. An account of his penetration of the German Foreign Office was published in *Studies in Intelligence* under the title "Alias George Wood." 4/ The fact that his principal agent was a volunteer and that Washington was most reluctant to accept the authenticity of the hundreds of documents and photographs of documents which the agent furnished to Dulles does not diminish the skill with which the case was handled. It was, incidentally, through this penetration that there was exposed the German agent Cicero, who furnished the Germans with copies of documents from the MOST SECRET files of the British Ambassador in Ankara. It is a wry fact that the Germans doubted the authenticity of Cicero's documents.

Among the best documented of Dulles's activities in Bern was his connection with the men inside Germany who were plotting against Hitler and whose attempt to assassinate Hitler on 20 July 1944 failed by the sheerest accident. Dulles was kept informed of all the steps of the plot and, after its failure, provided one of the very few survivors with the clothing and documents which enabled him to escape

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Germany. Dulles's own account of the plot and its bloody aftermath is contained in *Germany's Underground*. The survivor, Hans B. Gisevius, has also written on the subject. 5/

On 20 July 1954, Gisevius called Dulles in his office and said that he would like to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the assassination attempt by dining with him. The writer and Tracy Barnes were included by Dulles at the dinner, and, starting at cocktail time and lasting until midnight, were treated to a detailed blow-by-blow firsthand account of the whole affair. In the days immediately after the end of the war in Europe, Dulles, who was in Berlin as the head of the OSS mission, had run down a great many aspects of the matter, and gathered documents and personal testimony. He said, however, that Gisevius's account that evening ten years later filled in a number of blanks. It was a fascinating evening.

It was while Dulles was in Bern in 1945 that he carried on the secret negotiations with the German military commanders in Italy that led to their surrender. The details of this operation, known as

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"Operation Sunrise," were described by him in his book, *The Secret Surrender*. 6/ What was not divulged in that book, but which Dulles mentioned to the writer, was that at the same time feelers were put out by the German commanders on the Western Front. They were exploring the possibility of a German surrender to the Western Allies, while keeping up the war against the Soviet Union, so as to allow an occupation of Germany by the West. Dulles's lieutenant, the late Gero von Gaevernitz, was deeply involved in this matter. Tracy Barnes, who shared an office with von Gaevernitz in Bern, knew that such feelers had been made but knew nothing of their scope or who was involved. Dulles was instructed by Washington not to respond because it was believed that Stalin would interpret any such negotiations as a betrayal of the USSR and thus assure bitter relations between East and West even before the war was over.

Dulles returned to his law practice in New York in 1945, but his connection with intelligence continued. In January 1946, President Truman established the National Intelligence Authority and under it the Central Intelligence Group as well as a Director of Central Intelli-

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gence to coordinate the activities of the postwar intelligence community. Admiral Sidney W. Souers, its first head, was soon succeeded by Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg. In August 1946, General Vandenberg wrote Dulles asking him to become a member of a "small select Board of Consultants to advise me personally in the discharge of my responsibilities." 7/ Others who were similarly approached were Kingman Douglass, who later held several posts in CIG and CIA; William H. Jackson, who became DDCI under General Walter Bedell Smith; Robert A. Lovett, later Under Secretary of State; Paul H. Nitze, later Deputy Secretary of Defense; and Admiral Souers, previously director of CIG.

It became evident that this group of busy men could not all meet regularly in Washington, and in October 1946 Vandenberg gave up his original idea of regular monthly meetings and wrote to Dulles, hoping he could call on him to act as an advisor separately and as an individual. In fact, Dulles, W. H. Jackson, Douglass, and Nitze did meet together at least once, in November 1946. Shortly after Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter took over as director of the CIG, Dulles

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was again asked to act as a consultant. In his letter Hillenkoetter called for his "continued guidance" and expressed the hope that he might "feel free to call on you at any time for advice both regarding the internal and external affairs of this agency." 8/

Dulles had long agreed with General William Donovan that the United States needed a permanent independent intelligence service. When the matter was being discussed in the Congress in connection with the sweeping legislation which became the National Security Act of 1947, Dulles submitted to the Senate Armed Services Committee a long memorandum dated 25 April 1947 outlining his views as to the need for a Central Intelligence Agency, the components it should contain, and the desirability of civilian professional nonpolitical control. He emphasized that a peacetime service must be quite different from a wartime intelligence setup; and that it must deal with political, economic, social, and technical matters as well as military and strategic questions. He urged that it be supervised by a body smaller than the National Security Council -- i.e., one consisting of the Secretaries of

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State and Defense (or their designated high-ranking deputies) and a representative of the President.

Along with many other spokesmen -- including Vandenberg -- Dulles held that the Agency should be divorced from the function of recommending policy; have the task of evaluating intelligence; have its own personnel and appropriations; have access to all sources, including "Magic", the name then used colloquially for communications intelligence (COMINT); and have the sole responsibility for carrying out secret intelligence operations. 9/ Most of these recommendations were incorporated in the provisions of the National Security Act.

In 1948, President Truman and Secretary of Defense Forrestal wanted a study made of how the CIA was operating. The NSC called on Dulles to head such a study. He, with William H. Jackson and Matthew Correa, another New York lawyer, produced a comprehensive report dated 1 January 1949, in which a variety of organizational and functional changes were recommended. It was typical of General Smith that after he became DCI in October 1950 he prevailed on Dulles to join the Agency and

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handle one of the most difficult of the recommendations -- the bringing together of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), concerned with clandestine action operations, and the Office of Special Operations (OSO), concerned with clandestine intelligence collection and counter-intelligence. These two components had been quite separate, each had its own organization and procedures, and each had its own representatives in the field stations. Dulles, as an expert in clandestine operations, was to bring them together under common management. The actual merger was not completed until 1 August 1952.

On 16 November 1950, Dulles was designated Special Consultant to General Smith. His status was technically a little fuzzy. It had been contemplated that he would be appointed Deputy Director for Operations, and such a position was shown on an Agency organization chart published on 1 December 1950. He was, however, never actually appointed to it -- probably because the designation was too candid. He was on duty, and assumed responsibilities for clandestine operations for General Smith. He was formally appointed Deputy Director for Plans on 2 January 1951, and, although he was not a regular employee (he served "without

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compensation"), he worked on a full-time basis.

William H. Jackson resigned as DDCI on 3 August 1951, and on 23 August Dulles was appointed in his place, at which time he became a regular staff employee. He served as DDCI until General Smith became Under Secretary of State in the new Eisenhower administration on 9 February 1953, at which time he succeeded Smith as DCI.\*

There is evidence that Smith did not initially want Dulles to succeed him -- they were very different men in many ways and there was no bond of personal sympathy between them. 10/ Gordon Gray says he was approached by Smith and Jackson, who wanted to groom him as Smith's successor.\*\* Gray did not respond, however, saying that his first obligation

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\* Dulles served as Acting DCI from 9 to 26 February 1953. His appointment as DCI was announced by President Eisenhower on 24 January, submitted to the Senate on 10 February, and confirmed by that body on 23 February. He was sworn in as DCI on 26 February.

\*\* Admiral Souers told the late Ludwell Lee Montague that in 1950 Gray had been "a very eager candidate" to succeed Hillenkoetter as DCI. 12/

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was to continue for some time as President of the University of North Carolina. 11/

It has been alleged that John Foster Dulles engineered the appointment of Smith as Under Secretary of State so as to make the job of DCI available for his brother. 13/ The writer believes that there is no truth to this. John Foster Dulles undoubtedly wanted as Under Secretary a man who was a good administrator and who could run the State Department, a task for which the Secretary had little stomach. It is probable that President Eisenhower suggested Smith, who had been Eisenhower's chief of staff, as ideally qualified. It is undoubtedly true that Allen Dulles had long wanted to be DCI and believed that he was uniquely qualified. A contrived arrangement to put him in as DCI, however, would have been wholly out of character for both brothers.

#### Dulles Becomes DCI

It was when Dulles became DCI that his influence on the Agency reached its full effectiveness. Although he had been part of the Agency and in senior positions for well over two years, he was all that time serving

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under Smith, a man of very forceful character, with a style of leadership and control which obscured, if it did not eclipse, the personalities beneath him.

The basic organization of the CIA had been established by the time Dulles became Director. Smith, by the strength of his personality and reputation, had established the Agency's position in the US Government. He was respected in Congress and in the other parts of the Government. Furthermore, his military prestige, his rank, and his reputation gave him power in the armed services. There remained, however, serious problems in consolidating the Agency's position and in achieving order within CIA. Many, if not most, of the problems with other parts of the federal government arose out of the jealousies and resentments which necessarily arise when a new government organization takes over functions formerly carried out, at least in part, by old-line departments. The evaluation and synthesis of political and economic intelligence was very much like what the State Department was used to doing, and the evaluation and synthesis of military intelligence seemed to the services to be their function.

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As will appear below, the directives outlining the responsibilities of the CIA, in their early forms, carefully protected the old-line departments, making sure that CIA did not take over too much of their traditional duties.

Internally, there were serious problems. In the first place, although the framework for an effective Agency had been set up, adequate personnel were not always available. Competent staff could not be created in short order, and of course experience could only be gained over time. These problems coexisted with the presence of a good many officers who were taken on because of the pressure to expand during the Korean war and who were in many cases not temperamentally or professionally qualified for the long pull as intelligence officers.\* This situation was true in the overt side of the house, although perhaps more evident in the clan-

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\* Sherman Kent, in a discussion of Vandenberg's recruiting in 1946-47, says that "he [Vandenberg] told me: (1) that he wanted CIG to be in itself the substantive master of all competing departmental intelligence outfits, and (2) when I demurred about this, he told me that if he didn't fill all the slots he had been awarded, he might lose them.--Apparently, he went ahead full steam and recruited scores (if not hundreds) of people who were utterly unfitted for the work.--The old ORE was their haven." 14/

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destine services. In other words, there was a time of assimilation as well as recruiting to be gone through before a competent professional intelligence organization could come into being.

There were other personnel problems. In an expanding new organization, there were many ambitious officers who were on the lookout for chances to promote their own standing, even at the expense of their colleagues. Presiding over it all had been a Director who had little talent or perhaps inclination for easy, friendly personal relations. No one had set a tone of cooperation or good will in the organization.

These were among the basic problems which Dulles faced when he took over responsibility for the Agency.

Dulles had immense energy and overflowing zest; he brought to his work an enthusiasm and a belief in its value which were highly contagious. A man of transparent honesty, great courage, and with a talent for personal relations, no one could come into contact with him without being infected with his belief that intelligence was an honorable profession, essential to the national welfare, and calling for the best efforts of

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all manner of men. He was not of a mind with Henry Stimson who, as Secretary of State, disbanded the cryptographic organization of the State Department, and is said to have remarked, "Gentlemen do not read other people's mail."\*

Dulles came from a family which has been noted for its evangelical zeal. He saw in the Communist movement an avowed enemy of his country, which must be fought with every available weapon. A good fight had to be based on good information regarding the enemy's intentions and abilities. It was a missionary's fight for truth and virtue against the powers of darkness. It is characteristic that his favorite example of the earliest days of intelligence was the account in the Old Testament of Joshua sending spies into Jericho. When the new CIA building was being constructed, he chose to have chiseled into the wall of the lobby the quotation from the New Testament "and

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\* Although this remark has frequently been attributed to Mr. Stimson, no one has established when or where he made it.

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ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free." When it was suggested to him that some might find this inscription offensive, that they might feel that it was in bad taste to cloak the covert operations of the Agency behind the words of Jesus, he earnestly protested. Intelligence was the search for truth; if it fought the devil with his own weapons, it did so for a good cause and the most basic of American objectives was to have the truth prevail.

It was in furtherance of his desire to have the Agency recognized as having an important and valuable part in achieving national objectives that led him to make so many public appearances. When it was suggested that he made too many speeches, that the classic concept of a "silent service" had validity, he protested that he was not ashamed of the role of the Agency, that no one should be, and that it was highly desirable that the public know more about its work and value its contributions to the national welfare.\*

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\* It should be noted that Dulles's speeches were almost always about the Communist enemy or the work of his overt offices; he never discussed the clandestine operations or the covert side of the Agency.

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Such a point of view characterized all his relationships within the Agency. And it was his accessibility and insistence on personal contact with the working-level employees that spread his influence.

When responsible officers returned from overseas duty, he usually invited them to his office to tell him their views; when he was to be briefed on a particular matter, even on matters of economics or technology which were not his bent, he wanted to see the desk officer, not the chief of the division alone. In his dealings with Agency personnel, he was invariably courteous even when he criticized, as he did on many occasions. Unlike many high governmental officials, he was not averse to reading papers, which he did rapidly and with comprehension.

In general, Dulles delegated to his deputies the full responsibility for dealing with their respective tasks. The practice during his administration was for him to have frequent meetings with his senior deputies; such meetings were held daily for the most part and never less than three times a week. Any subject which he or they wished to raise at these meetings was permitted. He was also easily available to his associates.

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His energy seemed boundless. After a long day of testifying before a Congressional Committee, he would seem fresh and ready to listen to an officer who had a problem. He worked long hours and with unflagging attention. Despite his practice of delegating authority, he nevertheless kept in personal touch with those aspects of the Agency's work which particularly interested him.

Richard M. Bissell, Jr., who was DDP for two years under Dulles, says that he was at first annoyed by one habit that Dulles had. When the DCI saw a cable or had an idea which he wanted to discuss with regard to a particular operation of the Clandestine Services, he would pick up the telephone and talk to the relevant desk officer directly, bypassing the hierarchy of DDP, the division or staff chief, and the branch chief. Bissell protested to Dulles, who in reply said, in substance,

I intend to continue to call anyone I choose. If it is somebody in a subordinate position, he should tell his superiors about it. If they work for you, it's your job to see that they report to you. I also intend to instruct them to take specific actions. Again,

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it's up to you to see to it that they keep you informed. In any case in which you disagree with what I have said or instructed, you can always come back to me and say so. 15/

Bissell says that, although he at first resented this procedure, he came to realize its value and validity. Dulles had both the instinct and the experience to be an imaginative and resourceful case officer, and his instructions were almost always wise. This mode of activity kept supervisory personnel on their toes and was splendid for the morale of the desk officers. It also kept Dulles much more in touch with the caliber and activities of the officers in the Clandestine Services than would have been the case if the channels of command had been observed.

The writer for several years handled the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) account for the DCI. There were forty-odd working groups under the OCB at the time of its greatest activity, each of which included a representative of CIA, who had an alternate. Although these men and women represented Dulles as DCI -- that is, the whole Agency -- the nature of the work was such that it was appropriate that most of them came from the Clandestine Services. The activity had

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the full backing of the DDP himself, but it was not always easy to get Agency representatives designated, and many of them found the working group meetings pretty much of a bore.

One day the writer asked Dulles if he would be willing to meet with all these men and women to say that he was relying on them and believed they were doing a good job. Of course he would. Then a meeting would be set up when his schedule and that of the conference room in North Building at 2430 E St. permitted.

"Nonsense," said Dulles, "Almost all of them come from the DDP buildings beyond the Reflecting Pool. I will go down there." So, on the appointed day, Dulles appeared in the conference room in J Building, greeted fifteen or twenty of the assembly by their names, told them all that they were helping him and the Agency. After his talk, he chatted with a number of the audience and left them all with a warm glow. The writer's job was much easier from then on.

This sort of occasion was typical of his relationship to Agency people. When visiting stations abroad, he made a point of speaking to as many employees as he could, stenographers and file clerks

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as well as officers. This was not an act; it was a manifestation of his genuine liking for people, his deep feeling that all Agency people were linked in a common valuable enterprise, and his warm humanity.

Dulles probably had as great a roster of friends and acquaintances as any man who ever held a major public office in Washington. Some of them were old friends; others he had known during his days with Sullivan and Cromwell; still others he had gotten to know in his extensive foreign travels and work. He always seemed to find time to see almost anyone who wanted to talk to him. His assistants in CIA used to protest that he spent too much time talking to inconsequential people. He always answered that one never knew what useful information could be picked up unexpectedly. There is no doubt that his wide contacts kept him abreast of what was going on in the world to an amazing degree.

He undoubtedly got useful views and information from [REDACTED] and the New York bankers that he saw so often. He was performing a politically useful act when he let David Sarnoff, head of RCA,

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demonstrate a plastic hand-operated device on which special phonograph records could, with practice, be made to yield a recognizable voice. (Sarnoff wanted CIA to pay for hundreds of thousands of the devices and records and drop them behind the Iron Curtain). But the hours he spent with Countess Tolstoy and with others were a manifestation of his liking of and interest in people -- just people -- irrespective of their professional value to him. It was an endearing quality at a distance, but a great nuisance to those who wanted to see him on business.

He believed strongly in the desirability of Agency employees extending their education and training and he encouraged officers to attend graduate schools, participate in seminars and conferences, and generally broaden their knowledge and horizons. Part of his enthusiasm for having officers on the overt side of the house mingle with the academic and business communities was his belief that they would impress the latter favorably and thus be good apostles for the Agency. He was also always interested in and encouraged foreign travel for his employees, believing that personal experience abroad would

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enable them better to understand and evaluate the actions of and events in foreign countries.

Dulles During the McCarthy Era

Shortly after he became DCI, Dulles first tangled with Senator Joseph R. McCarthy. It is difficult in retrospect to appreciate the miasma of fear, suspicion, and pusillanimity which McCarthy had spread over official Washington. With no regard to facts, he had used his Senate subcommittee as a sounding board to amplify charges of Communist influence and association in all quarters. In 1952, he had publicly alleged that General Marshall was a "man steeped in falsehood -- in whose activities can be seen a pattern which finds decisions...always and invariably serving the world policy of the Kremlin." Such a charge should have made McCarthy seem ridiculous. It did not. In fact, his ability to make such a statement without arousing a violent reaction was proof that he was virtually invulnerable, that no one could or would dare to stand up to him. During the 1952 Presidential campaign, candidate Eisenhower was persuaded to eliminate from a speech in Wisconsin a defense of his revered former chief, General

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Marshall. Attacks on personnel in the State Department and USIA were met with timorous dismissals of the people attacked.

Dulles had not been DCI more than a few weeks before he had his first dealings with Senator McCarthy, chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations. The first record of contact between Dulles and McCarthy is of a closed meeting of the latter's Subcommittee to which Dulles was called. 16/ At that meeting he was presented with a list of "alleged subversives and other misfits in CIA." 17/ McCarthy refused to give the press any account of the meeting and said only "this does not mean we are investigating CIA." It appeared that several names on the list were of people unknown to CIA, a few were of people who had left the Agency, and only two were of current employees who had been thoroughly investigated and cleared. Walter L. Pforzheimer, then Legislative Counsel, discussed the matter with Mr. Flanagan, General Counsel of the Senate Subcommittee and touched on the way the CIA answer should be handled. It appears to have been an amicable businesslike

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meeting. 18/ There were apparently further dealings with the subcommittee, because the Journal of Legislative Counsel for 28 May 1953 states that "Mr. Robert Kennedy of the staff of the McCarthy subcommittee called."

In early July 1953, McCarthy was in trouble. He had named as his Chief of Staff one J. B. Matthews. This man had very recently published in the magazine *American Mercury* a piece in which he accused the Protestant clergy of the United States with being infiltrated by Communists, claiming there were 5,000 Communists among them. This proved too much for the other members of his subcommittee. The three Democratic members resigned (Senators Symington, McClelland, and Jackson). Their nominal reason was to protest a subcommittee vote, 4-3, which gave Chairman McCarthy the right to hire all staff employees. But even the other Republican majority members (Dirksen, Mundt, and Potter) could not stomach Matthews. After President Eisenhower had publicly blasted McCarthy's charges, the Republican subcommittee members and the Senate leadership told McCarthy that Matthews would have to go.

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McCarthy needed some new attack to cover up this setback. So, on the day that the Matthews resignation was announced, 9 July, McCarthy got the Senate floor in the midst of a debate on a wholly different subject and demanded that there be a meeting of his subcommittee that afternoon. Permission had to be sought because, under Senate rules, subcommittees could not meet without special permission while the full Senate was in session. The reason McCarthy gave for wanting an immediate meeting was, he said, because Allen Dulles was guilty of a "most blatant attempt to thwart the authority of the Senate." The headlines the next day were "McCarthy accuses Allen Dulles." 19/

The background of this charge is as follows. On the morning of 9 July, Roy Cohn, in his capacity as subcommittee counsel, called Pforzheimer, the legislative counsel for the Agency. Cohn said the committee wanted the immediate appearance of William P. Bundy. (It is alleged that McCarthy's subcommittee had a list of people he might want to investigate and that Bundy happened to come at the top of the list alphabetically.) Pforzheimer replied that he did not know where Bundy

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was but would call back. He then spoke to Robert Amory, the DDI. Amory and Pforzheimer informed the DCI who, after consulting General Robert Cutler (the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs), instructed that Bundy was to go on immediate leave. Amory says he so instructed Bundy, who left.

Pforzheimer was called again by Cohn later the same day and was told that Bundy was on leave and was not available. Cohn told Pforzheimer this was untrue as he had called Bundy's office earlier that day and knew he was in. Cohn told Pforzheimer that Bundy was

a serious security case; that he had "contributed heavily" to the Alger Hiss defense fund; that he belonged to a couple of front organizations and had made many "outrageous" statements about town which indicated his security unreliability.

He asked Pforzheimer to check where Bundy might be and to call again.

Pforzheimer spoke to Amory again and the latter ascertained that indeed some man had called that morning and had been told that Bundy was away from his desk. Pforzheimer called Cohn from Amory's office; Cohn was much upset. He accused "someone in authority"

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of causing Bundy to disappear, threatened "that McCarthy would unleash a dreadful blast and that the 'heat' against Bundy came from 'places' high up on the new team." 20/

Shortly after noon, Cohn called Pforzheimer and said that McCarthy wished him and Bundy to appear before an executive session of the subcommittee that day. Pforzheimer, who had discussed the matter further with Dulles, Amory, and Lawrence R. Houston (the General Counsel), told Cohn that Dulles had instructed him to say that it was an Agency rule that employees would not appear before Congressional committees and that only the Director answered to Congressional committees where appropriate. Cohn called again to say that the meeting of the committee would be at two. Pforzheimer called back to say that he would not appear. The meeting was postponed to three, and although McCarthy had been told that Pforzheimer would not appear, the Senator sent word that he expected Pforzheimer. When Cohn called Pforzheimer again, the latter reaffirmed Dulles's position that only the DCI would appear before the committee. Cohn suggested that Pforzheimer might be subpoenaed. (The matter of a possible subpoena had

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been discussed with the DCI, and it had been agreed that if one were served, it should be accepted and referred to the DCI, who might take the matter up with the White House.). Pforzheimer remembers that a subpoena was in fact served on him and that he gave it to the DCI.

Some time during that day (9 July), Dulles did probably take the matter up in the White House. He had been at an NSC meeting that morning (Thursday) but it was probably during the afternoon that he took up the McCarthy matter. Amory believes that Dulles discussed the matter with the President and that the latter was reluctant to challenge the right of Congress to investigate. Amory says Dulles returned to the Agency and told Amory about the conversation. Amory says that he suggested that Dulles talk to Vice President Nixon, that Dulles did so, and that Nixon counseled him to continue his refusal to let CIA employees be subpoenaed. Pforzheimer only knows that the subpoena issued to him was taken by Dulles and disappeared -- nothing further was heard of it. He believes that Vice President Nixon had it cancelled, and the contemporary press suggested an important role for Nixon in the

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CIA-McCarthy affair.

Much of the above appeared in the press, including the previously mentioned attack on Dulles made on 9 July by McCarthy on the floor of the Senate.

On the next day, Dulles met in a closed session with McCarthy and two of the Republican members, presumably Mundt and Potter. (The third member, Dirksen, seems to have been absent from meetings at which particularly controversial matters were raised. As stated above, the Democratic members had resigned from the McCarthy subcommittee.) A joint statement was issued as a result of that meeting; 21/ in it Dulles did not question the committee's right to subpoena witnesses to "uncover graft, corruption and subversion in any branch of the government" but he pointed out that if CIA employees were called "it might well impair the work of the Agency." McCarthy and Dulles agreed to seek a formula under which the committee could question CIA personnel under conditions not imperiling security. McCarthy said he would give CIA all the information he had regarding Bundy so that it could review his security status. The *New York Times* commented that McCarthy

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seemed on the defensive. He retreated in effect from the most direct challenge he has made so far - that the top secret CIA is not "immune" to investigation.... Washington observers regarded the statement as a face-saving arrangement for Senator McCarthy. The feeling was that he had lost another round. 22/

Other press comments included a statement that the leadership had let it be known that it feels that the CIA should not be subject to investigation by a Congressional Committee. 23/

The press generally, including Joseph Alsop, reported a victory for Dulles.\* When Dulles saw the Alsop column which ascribed an important role to Nixon, Amory says Dulles accused him, "You've been talking again." Amory denied having talked at all about the matter and later told Dulles that Alsop had gotten the story from Nixon. The story also appeared in the *Washington Evening Star*. The Journal of the Agency's Legislative Counsel (Pforzheimer) under date of 6 August 1953 refers to McCarthy's fury at this piece and his assumption that CIA had leaked it. Later in the year, a member of McCarthy's staff, in talking

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\* See press clippings in the files of the CIA Historical Intelligence Collection.

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to CIA's Legislative Counsel, was reported as having said

The McCarthy people felt that they had taken a bad beating in the Bundy case and were not prepared to tangle with CIA again until they had an airtight case. The new Staff Director, Frank Carr, is not particularly anxious to take on CIA at all; Roy Cohn is proceeding with great caution. 24/

An interesting sidelight is recalled by Mrs. Dulles.

At the end of the 10 July meeting, McCarthy suggested to Dulles that they go out of the Senate hearing room by the back door to avoid the crowds, press and others, which were always attracted by McCarthy meetings. Dulles agreed, but when they emerged, the entire press photographic corps was there and snapped pictures as McCarthy put his arm around Mr. Dulles's shoulders. McCarthy had, of course, arranged it all.

McCarthy did not, however, give up; he exchanged correspondence with Dulles between the middle of July and 3 August. Dulles said in that correspondence that all the data, including McCarthy's charges against Bundy, had been placed before a loyalty review board and that he did not believe it would be "appropriate" for him to comment in the meantime on McCarthy's charges. This again infuriated McCarthy, who released the

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correspondence with Dulles and accused him on 3 August of doing "tremendous damage" to the CIA by "covering up" information about one of its top aides -- namely Bundy.

On 10 August, McCarthy said his subcommittee had new evidence indicating that at least one member of the Communist Party had access to secrets of the CIA. The CIA Legislative Counsel, Walter Pforzheimer, tried to see McCarthy on the 11th. He was out but had asked that Roy Cohn handle the matter. Pforzheimer asked who it was that was alleged to be a member of the Communist Party and to have access to classified material of the CIA. He was given the name of an individual who worked in the Government Printing Office. A check of the situation showed that no CIA classified material was printed by the GPO -- only official blank forms. On 12 August, Pforzheimer so informed a member of McCarthy's staff. The Deputy Public Printer submitted a statement to the same effect to the subcommittee. But when the record of the hearings was printed, it contained only the original allegations and no reference to the infor-

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mation Pforzheimer had given the subcommittee or to the GPO statement.

Immediately after the printed record was issued, Dulles wrote a letter to McCarthy. 25/ He rehearsed the McCarthy charges, the information Pforzheimer had given to the subcommittee staff, and the statement by the GPO.

Under the circumstances, therefore, I would appreciate it if you would include this letter in the printed hearings so that the fact that CIA does not have classified material printed in the main GPO plant is made a matter of record.

Concluding his letter, Dulles requested that McCarthy make available to him any information concerning the Agency or its personnel which came up in the course of McCarthy's investigations, so that such matters could be thoroughly looked into. There is no record of any answer to this letter.

McCarthy and his staff had by no means given up on CIA after the summer of 1953. During the Army-McCarthy hearings in April 1954, it was brought out that in August 1953, Cohn was trying to get an Army commission for his co-investigator David Schine, who was about to be drafted. Cohn called General Walter

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B. Smith, who was then Under Secretary of State, to ask if the CIA could not arrange to have Schine commissioned and assigned to CIA as he had "investigative experience." 26/ (Cohn probably called the State Department because it had in the past not been very resolute in the face of McCarthy attacks, although there is no evidence that General Smith had been anything but firm.) General Smith said that CIA used only a very few commissioned officers who were specialists but offered to call Dulles. Smith read on the stand a letter which he had written to the Secretary of Defense about this matter which said in part

Mr. Cohn said I need not do this. The CIA, he said, was too juicy a subject for future investigation and it would not be right to ask them to get Mr. Schine commissioned and then investigate the organization later.

The Secretary of the Army testified on this subject on 23 April. Regarding Schine, he said that it had been suggested to him

that maybe the CIA could use David Schine. I said I would be glad to talk to Allen Dulles about that, the head of the CIA, ... I did, the next morning.

Question by Jenkins, McCarthy's counsel: "With

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what result?"

Answer: "Negative."

On 2 June 1954, McCarthy publicly charged that there was serious Communist infiltration in CIA, as well as in "plants making atomic and hydrogen weapons." Dulles promptly called the charges false and said McCarthy had offered no evidence to support his charges "although he had been asked to do so by CIA as long ago as last October 22." The press commented that McCarthy implied an intention to investigate CIA and that this could bring a confrontation with the Administration, since Vice President Nixon had encouraged Dulles not to allow CIA employees to accept subpoenas.

The next move came later in June 1954, when it was reported that McCarthy had assigned Donald A. Surine to make a preliminary investigation of CIA. Surine, it was reported, had been "dropped from the rolls" of the FBI in 1950, and had been refused security clearance by the Department of Defense. The hue and cry regarding Surine led to his being dropped by McCarthy too. The investigation of CIA was postponed indefinitely when McCarthy promised to cooperate with the Hoover Com-

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mission, which proposed to include the Agency among the parts of the Federal Government it was going to study, implying that "he would postpone indefinitely his own investigation." 27/

On the same day, Dulles saw this statement of McCarthy's in the press and wrote to him. He referred to McCarthy's repeated allegations of Communist infiltration of the CIA. After calling attention to his previous denials of such infiltration, Dulles said, "In the event that you should have any evidence in support of these allegations, it would be of the utmost importance that I should have an immediate opportunity to investigate them." Dulles noted that McCarthy had said he would make his material available to General Mark W. Clark, who was to head the Task Force of the Hoover Commission looking into CIA. Dulles said he was sending a copy of his letter to Clark. No reply was received from McCarthy.

Early the next year, on 15 January 1955, the press reported that McCarthy had stated that he had given to Clark information on "alleged communism and corruption" in CIA. Dulles on the same day telegraphed

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Clark and referred to the press statement and to his letter to McCarthy of the previous July. He told Clark that

in the event that any of the information which Senator McCarthy now states he has turned over to you contains, as alleged, any indication of communism or corruption in the CIA, I would investigate the matter immediately and thoroughly.

Accordingly, he asked Clark to make any such material available to him. On 18 January, General Clark replied saying he had not had an opportunity to go over the typewritten material which McCarthy had given him. He would turn over to Dulles anything which seemed to require immediate remedial action.

On 21 January 1955, Dulles wrote to Senator McClelland, who had succeeded McCarthy as Chairman of the subcommittee when the Democratic Party took control of the Senate in the 1954 elections. He referred to his previous correspondence with McCarthy and asked for any documentation McClelland might have to support McCarthy's allegations. McClelland replied on 7 March saying that the subcommittee files had been in McCarthy's possession but had been returned and would be reviewed. That was the end of that

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correspondence.

Dulles saw Clark on 17 February 1955 and took up the matter of the material McCarthy had given the General. Dulles's memorandum of conversation says:

General Clark referred to my communications with him about the McCarthy material. He said he had looked it over and indicated he did not consider it of any great significance. He said, however, that McCarthy had promised to look through his papers and that he had quite a lot more he would want to give to the Clark Committee. The General added that nothing further had come recently. I clearly gained the impression that General Clark did not feel that anything was disclosed in the papers which required immediate action by CIA. I made it entirely clear to him that if such was the case, I would want to investigate it immediately. 28/

This record of correspondence does not in retrospect seem very spectacular. It would seem that any department head would do much the same and try to get to the bottom of charges made against his organization. Yet in the atmosphere of 1953-54, Dulles's stand was courageous and almost unique. Other Government departments were intimidated, no one in high position in the Government had openly challenged

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McCarthy. In the Alger Hiss case, a man who had held a high position in the State Department had been convicted of passing classified documents to the Communist apparatus. The trauma resulting from this case was still felt throughout the Government. Therefore when a senior official, Allen Dulles, denied McCarthy's charges openly, refused to allow his employees to be subpoenaed, and publicly demanded that McCarthy make available to him any evidence of Communist influence or subversion, his conduct stood out in marked contrast to that of other leading figures. The unscrupulous behavior of the McCarthy team, their arrogance, and their disregard for truth or fair play had intimidated virtually everyone. In 1970, the writer discussed this matter with General Cabell, who had been Dulles's DDCI. It is greatly to the credit of Cabell that he said, "Allen was very courageous. I doubt if I would have had the courage to do what he did." It would be easy enough to say, "Dulles did only what any honorable man would have done." It is easy enough, in retrospect, to forget the fear which McCarthy had spread, and the temptation to appease him. General

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Cabell did not forget, and his testimony as to Dulles's courage is thereby all the more eloquent.

The people in the Agency soon found that their new Director would not be intimidated and would stand behind them. They heard this directly in the summer of 1953, when Dulles called a large meeting of Agency employees, reviewed his dealings with McCarthy and his subcommittee, stated his complete confidence in the Agency's personnel, and said that if anyone was going to be questioned, it would be himself. He warned that McCarthy's retreat should not be hailed as a victory; in such matters there were no victories and if one came out with one's hide intact, that was the best that could be expected. It would be an exaggeration to say that the series of successful confrontations with McCarthy set the tone of the Agency, but the impact was important, and many who were in the Agency at the time believe it was a major contribution to the excellent *esprit de corps* that was so characteristic of the Agency during the following years. There are those who claim that the repercussions were felt far beyond the confines of the Agency, particularly among students and others

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in the academic world, and were an important factor in attracting to CIA the most competent young people coming to work for the Government.

#### Dulles in the Government

His flair for good personal relations and his political skill, in the sense of negotiating acceptable solutions to bureaucratic controversies, were evidenced in the generally good relationships with other parts of the Government, including the Congress.

There is every indication that he had the respect and confidence of President Eisenhower. General Cabell believed that the relationship was warm and relaxed. Gordon Gray, who had many occasions to see them together, characterized President Eisenhower's attitude towards Dulles as one of warmth and confidence, but not intimacy. There are no tributes to Allen Dulles in the Eisenhower memoirs like those given to John Foster Dulles and Lewis Strauss. The many personal notes of greeting signed "DE" in Dulles's files were for Christmas or birthdays and are probably more a testimonial to good staff work than an indication of personal thought. Yet it is clear that President

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Eisenhower liked him and valued his judgment.\* He was included in a number of the meetings between the President and British Prime Minister Macmillan at Camp David in March 1959. The Eisenhower memoirs show many occasions in which Dulles was included in small groups that the President called to advise him in such crises as the Taiwan Strait, Berlin, Suez, Lebanon, and Indochina. Late in December 1956, the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA) met with President Eisenhower. A memo covering a meeting of the board on the next day stated that the board told the President that "they considered Dulles to be highly qualified and doing a good job. The President said he had complete confidence in Mr. Dulles." 30/

Dulles's main business with the White House was done primarily through the senior assistants

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\* Sherman Kent has noted: "I have heard Dulles say on several occasions that every time he felt that he had to see the President, he saw him -- and on very short notice." 29/

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to the President. In particular, the files show a constant contact with the President's staff secretary, Colonel (after 1957, Brigadier General) Andrew Goodpaster, as well as frequent communications with various special assistants to the President: Sherman Adams, Robert Cutler, C. D. Jackson (with whom Dulles had warm personal rapport), Gordon Gray, and Dillon Anderson.

Dulles was very close to his brother, John Foster. And aside from the ties of personal affection, it is the testimony of those that knew them both that Foster respected the opinions of his brother and often discussed with him, on the telephone and in private, many matters that were not strictly within the field of intelligence. Although Foster was clearly the older brother and the head of the family, there was an easy interchange between the two. In meetings at which both were present, however, both took pains to act quite formally and correctly. There were those who felt that the close relationship between the brothers gave Allen Dulles a special "in" and consequently a freer hand in conducting the affairs of the Agency than he would have had otherwise, for

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Foster Dulles was clearly the most powerful personality in the Eisenhower cabinet. The very fact that some people believed that the relations between the brothers gave him an advantage may have, in fact, contributed to his status in the Government. Nevertheless, those that observed him most closely testify that he was meticulous in avoiding trading on his relations with his brother, and there is no doubt that his position in intelligence was earned and in no way depended on that of his brother. Indeed, Gordon Gray says that there were important instances in the NSC when the two brothers expressed diametrically opposed assessments of particular situations.

His relations with the Congress, particularly with the special subcommittees that dealt with CIA appropriations and affairs, were excellent. In fact, he used to complain that the committees would not listen when he tried to go into detail about how the Agency proposed to spend the money he requested. Either they said they did not wish to be burdened with knowledge of things they could not reveal, or they asked about specific foreign developments which

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interested them personally. Dulles discussed this matter at a meeting with the PBCFIA in 1959. 31/  
The report of that meeting says

The Board was unanimous in its view that this reflected the Committee's confidence in the Director and that he should feel no concern about the need for pursuing budget matters further unless the Committee required it.

H. Gates Lloyd, who as ADDS sometimes accompanied Dulles to committee hearings, has a revealing story. After one long session with the House Appropriations Subcommittee, Dulles and Lloyd were walking down the hall with Congressman Gerald Ford. "What was that meeting about?" asked Ford. When he was told it was a budget hearing he said, "That's what I thought, but the word 'dollar' wasn't ever mentioned."

Dulles's relations with other parts of the Government were generally excellent. He inspired trust, he was genial, he came with a glamorous reputation in intelligence and the status which membership in an important New York law firm gave him; his tweedy, pipe-smoking manner was disarming. He made a point in his personal contacts within Government

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of emphasizing his role as an intelligence advisor and of eschewing any hint of wanting to advise on or make policy. Such a practice allayed the fears of those who might have been jealously guarding their bureaucratic prerogatives. And then he was so obviously anxious to be friendly and he so clearly liked people that his attitude was contagious. His desire to stay clear of partisan politics was shown in his regular habit of leaving Washington for foreign travel during national political campaigns.

There was a reverse side to Dulles's affability, his desire to be liked, his preference for not forcing issues, and his belief that time spent in reaching a solution acceptable to all parties was well spent. His *modus operandi* meant that substantive issues on which there was disagreement with other government agencies did not get settled promptly or decisively. The matter of the creation of a subcommittee in the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) to coordinate intelligence on guided missiles was discussed in the IAC for about two years before he took action to force the issue by writing to the Secretary of Defense,

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essentially urging that the Secretary overrule the Army, Navy, and Joint Staff intelligence components (which the Secretary did). The matter of the coordination of the clandestine collection activities of the military, particularly in Europe, dragged on for years and was barely brought under control at the time Dulles resigned.

#### The Great White Case Officer

The accepted cliché about Dulles's role in the Agency is to refer to him as "Ascham,\* the Great White Case Officer." He was accused, in an out of the

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\* Ascham was his Agency pseudonym. He was vastly entertained when in 1958 the writer called to his attention the following passage from Herodotus's *Histories*:

Continuing up stream [i.e., up the Nile] ...one comes to the Deserters - a people whose name is *Ascham*, a word which would mean in Greek "those who stand on the left hand of the king." They were a body of men two hundred and forty thousand strong, of the Egyptian warrior class, who went over to the Ethiopians during the reign of Psammetichus.... Now it happened in Psammetichus' time that the Egyptians were kept on garrison duty for three years without being relieved, and this was the cause of their desertion. They discussed their grievances, came to a unanimous resolution; and (footnote continued on next page)

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Agency, of devoting too much time to specific operations of the Clandestine Services. The President's Board felt this way; the survey of the DDP area attached to the report of the Clark Task Force of the Hoover Commission of 1955 implies the same. The arguments about his appointment of a Chief of Staff involved the charge that he did not spend enough time on the overall problems of coordination and the management of the Agency.\* There is no doubt that

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went off in a body to Ethiopia. The king, on hearing the news, gave chase and overtook them, and the story goes that when he besought them to return and used every argument to dissuade them from abandoning their wives and children and the gods of their country, one of their number pointed, in reply, to his private parts and said that wherever *those* were, there would be no lack of wives and children. So they continued their journey to Ethiopia and put themselves at the disposal of the Ethiopian king, by whom they were well rewarded, for he gave them permission to expel certain Ethiopians with whom he was on bad terms, and to settle on their land. The result of their living there was that the Ethiopians learned Egyptian manners and became more civilized.

\* See Volume IV, Chapter 4.

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clandestine operations were fascinating to him. He had had interesting and valuable experience in that field in Switzerland during two World Wars. There was in his temperament an element of romantic boyishness which responded to the cloak-and-dagger side of intelligence. Once, during the height of the missile gap crisis, when he had been briefed on a highly technical collection method, he said sadly to the briefer, "You're taking all the fun out of intelligence." 32/

It is no accident that the last two books\* he edited for Harper and Row were *Great True Spy Stories*

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\* Dulles is the author of the following books:

1. [with Hamilton Fish Armstrong] *Can We Be Neutral?* Harper & Bros., for Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1936.
2. [with Hamilton Fish Armstrong] *Can America Stay Neutral?* Harper, New York, 1939.
3. *Germany's Underground*, Macmillan, New York, 1947.
4. *The Craft of Intelligence*, Harper-Row, New York, 1963. The New American Library, New York, 1965 (Paper).
5. *The Secret Surrender*, Harper & Row, New York, 1966.
6. *Great True Spy Stories*, Harper & Row, New York, 1968.
7. *Great Spy Stories from Fiction*, Harper & Row, 1969.

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(1968) and *Great Spy Stories from Fiction* (1969).

It was undoubtedly true that he undertook these books in order to make some money, as he told the writer.

His personal means were modest -- one does not accumulate wealth on a Government salary -- and he had a taste for a generous standard of living plus heavy expenses for the care of his only son whose brain was permanently damaged when as a Marine he was severely wounded in Korea. Still, there were other subjects he could have written about, including his own experiences.

Part of the appeal of clandestine intelligence was in the matching of wits with an opponent. Quick of mind, intuitive, Dulles found real satisfaction for many of his basic urges in the field commonly known as political action and in counterintelligence, where the uncovering of the opponent's moves called for imagination and an understanding of how he thought and acted. He frequently spoke of the necessity of mounting more "deception" operations -- i.e., actions whose purpose is to make your opponent believe what you want him to believe. The interest and appeal to him of intelligence activities was not only in the

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acts themselves; he felt that there was a strong moral element involved. As has been mentioned, he believed devoutly in the rightness of his cause. It was a manifestation of the evangelical streak which ran through the whole generation of Dulleses. Allen Dulles was not, however, one for taking the moralistic stands so characteristic of his brother Foster, nor did he express himself in the rather didactic terms used by his sister Eleanor in the years she spent trying to make West Berlin a shining island of light surrounded by the Communist darkness. In a way, he was more humanistic in his approach and expressed himself by action rather than words.

One aspect of covert action which particularly appealed to him was embodied in the various organizations and publications supported by CIA to combat the phalanx of Communist-dominated bodies which came into being in the postwar years. He believed strongly in the necessity of providing intellectually acceptable instrumentalities for the exchange and development of liberal thought for the center and center-left forces which were coming to the fore, or seeking

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means of expression, in the post-World War II world. The rightist elements had been defeated and repudiated by the war and showed little chance of revival. The far left, in particular the Communists, were actively seeking to capture the young, labor, and the intellectuals. Dulles firmly believed that a liberal alternative to the Communists was essential to US interests, a view which was also strongly held by responsible officers in the State Department. While there was widespread response to moderate liberalism, the funds and organizational skills needed to harness and activate the center left were lacking. Europe had no outstanding journals of liberal opinion; this gap was filled, at least in part, by CIA, which supported *Encounter* in English and *Preuves* in French. (The *Partisan Review* was also CIA-supported at one time.) The funds and effort spent on the Congress of Cultural Freedom, on the Asia Foundation, and on various book publishing ventures had the same motivation.

The Communists were particularly active in the trade union movement on the Continent as well as in Latin America and Asia. The non-Communist liberal

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trade unions lacked funds and organizational skills. Directly through the US labor organizations, the AFL and CIO, the Agency sought to build up the non-Communists, whether they were socialist oriented or uncommitted. Dulles took a particular interest in this activity. Comparable support was given to organizations of students, women, jurists, etc. CIA support for this type of activity was not alone the result of Dulles's predilections; much of the initiative came from outside the Agency and such support had started before he became DCI, indeed in some cases before he joined the Agency. The idea of an active movement which was intellectually appealing to non-Communist liberals or others who wished to see a new order established on the wreckage of World War II was, however, very congenial to Dulles and engaged his personal attention and encouragement as much as, if not more than, any other activity of the Agency.

Of equal attraction were the fields of propaganda, as exemplified by Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty as well as the efforts to further the political fortunes of centrist political figures

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in countries of concern to the United States. Those who waited outside his office for their appointments became very familiar with the appearance of the case officers who were working with Dulles on organizing the Italian center parties or promoting the careers of Magsaysay in the Philippines or [REDACTED]

His intense interest in covert action did not mean that he slighted the clandestine collection of intelligence. His experiences in Switzerland during two wars had been heavily concentrated in this field. He was aware, however, of the extreme difficulty of penetrating the Soviet Union by means of agents and, while he gave support to attempts to do so, he realized that penetrations through third countries, both in the Satellites and in the Communist parties of non-Communist countries, were more fruitful. He was keenly interested in defections from the Communists; he encouraged efforts to induce defections and followed particular cases with great attention, realizing that defectors could be a most valuable source of intelligence. Those who had frequent contact with him were aware of the amount of time he

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spent on CIA efforts to determine the *bona fides* of defectors. The wealth of material which was obtained from Penkovsky, a "defector in place," was of particular satisfaction to him.

Dulles's imagination and readiness to grasp the intelligence potential of unconventional collection methods were manifest in the enthusiasm with which he supported such projects as the U-2 and the Berlin tunnel. In addition to recognizing the value of the intelligence obtained from clandestine sources, he got satisfaction from being able, when briefing the President or the NSC, to report some tidbit that had been obtained clandestinely. And no one could have been more pleased when his Agency procured the text of Khrushchev's 1956 speech at the XXth Communist Party Congress denouncing Stalin.

Dulles's interest in clandestine collection was shown as early as in the memorandum which he submitted to the Congress in connection with the consideration of the National Security Act.\* There he insisted that

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\* Page 13, above.

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CIA must have primary (and he may well have thought exclusive) responsibilities for espionage and counter-espionage abroad. His long struggle with the military services over the "agreed activities" problem, dealt with at length below,\* showed his attachment to this principle, and he was experienced enough to know that an assertion of jurisdiction would in the long run be successful only if it was backed by performance.

#### New Techniques

His personal interest in the clandestine aspects of CIA's mission did not, however, blind him to the importance -- to the essentiality -- of other aspects of intelligence. In the memorandum which he submitted to the Congress in 1947, he said:

Because of its glamour and mystery, over-emphasis is generally placed on what is called secret intelligence, namely the intelligence that is obtained by secret means and by secret agents. During war this form of intelligence takes on an added importance but in time of peace the bulk of intelligence can be obtained through overt channels .... A proper analysis of the intelligence obtainable by these overt, normal and above-board means would supply us with over 80 percent, I should estimate,

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\* Volume II, Chapter 2, below.

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of the information required for the guidance of our national policy. 33/

This analysis required competence and continuity of service. Its objectivity would be assured by having those doing the analysis and evaluation divorced from the making or carrying out of policy.

A review of the changes in the Agency during the Dulles administration brings one thing out clearly. The increase in the status of CIA, in its acceptability to other parts of the Government, and the progressive absorption by the Agency of functions which were initially handled by other members of the community were not the result of successful bureaucratic infighting, of enlarged claims of jurisdiction, or of decrees from on high. They resulted from an appreciation that it was to everyone's benefit to have certain tasks centralized, coupled with the competence and continuity of service which CIA could offer, and the acceptability of Dulles as a person by other high Government officials.

The Office of Research and Reports in CIA first addressed itself to economic analysis of the USSR, then to its satellites, then to East-West economic relations, until it finally was the recognized expert

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in economic analysis for all areas of the world. Other components of the intelligence community carried on their own economic work, but gradually these decreased in size until they virtually disappeared, although the formal directives of the NSC, which allocated responsibilities, did not change and are today in many cases wholly out of step with the objective facts. No one would have accused Dulles of any expertise in the disciplines of economic analysis. He did, however, recognize that it was essential to the production of adequate national intelligence. He gave support, allocated funds, and appreciated the product of ORR.

A comparable situation existed with regard to scientific and technical intelligence. Dulles had no scientific or technical training or bent; his was not a temperament which was compatible with the rigorous examinations and manipulations of details involved. Yet he saw the need for this kind of work, he was quick and imaginative in grasping the potential benefits to be obtained, and he gave it full support. One need only point out that during his administration

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the U-2 system was developed and became of major importance to US intelligence. This system, which included the research and development of the plane and the cameras, weather forecasting, and arrangements with foreign countries for takeoff and landing rights as well as the exploitation of the photographs, required for its development a mind and temperament that could deal with scientific and technical details. Richard M. Bissell, Jr., had such a mind, and he can truthfully be given the major credit for the spectacular success of the project, but he could not have achieved this success without the firm and continuous backing of his principal. Dulles grasped the potentialities of the new technique and, having the courage and enthusiasm needed to carry through the experiment, willingly lent his own talents of persuasion and pressure. The U-2 is only one such case. It was during Dulles's years that intelligence satellites were developed and put into operation, with CIA playing a major role. The same is true of ELINT, which grew from an intuition of the potential of the British "noise listening" experiments into a highly

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sophisticated tool which was invaluable in monitoring the Soviet missile program.. In many such enterprises it was necessary to have long negotiations with Defense, the Bureau of the Budget, the White House, and presentations to the Congress. Many of these negotiations were carried on at levels below that of the DCI; in technical matters, General Cabell was deeply involved. But often the backing and the personal participation of Dulles were also required, and he rose to those occasions.

#### Dulles as DCI

Dulles took his role as principal intelligence advisor and his statutory responsibility to correlate and disseminate national intelligence very seriously. During the Eisenhower years, he regularly briefed the NSC at each meeting, giving the latest information on issues that were currently in the forefront of attention and bringing up matters which he believed the members should be informed about. He was good at this; he had the mechanism for preparing for himself briefings well organized and responsive to his wishes and style of action. He set great store on his responsibility for the preparation of formal

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national intelligence, particularly the National Estimates. Although the Office of National Estimates was nominally a part of the DDI complex, it was in fact responsible to him personally.\* He took a great interest in his Board of National Estimates and in assuring that it was composed of men on whom he could rely. And he did rely on them. It would be an exaggeration to say that he studied each draft estimate carefully. He read so quickly and comprehended so fast that often it was difficult to know how much he had taken in. The time he spent on an estimate often seemed insufficient to the observer. Yet he was concerned with the judgments the estimates made and would make changes, particularly when he believed that a judgment was too categorical. To some this may have seemed to be trimming or fuzzing up a judgment to make it more acceptable to a reader who might find it too dogmatic. It was in part, at least, a reflection of his philosophical inclination to give weight to the unknown or the unforeseeable. He was a sophisticated realist whose experience

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\* It became formally attached to the DCI's office years later -- in January 1966.

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had taught him that effort or logic did not always govern the way things happened. He would often cite the instance when he was asked by President Eisenhower the chances of success of the Castillo Armas revolt in Guatemala. He had answered that if Castillo Armas were supplied with planes, his chances of success were about 20%, without the planes his chances were almost nil. In general, he did with estimates much as he did with many of his responsibilities -- that is, he made a considerable effort to provide himself with assistants and subordinates whom he trusted, and then relied on their having done the detailed analysis and evaluation necessary.

There were some fields in which this reliance on subordinates was particularly clear. During the 1950's, an inordinate amount of time was spent on the field which can in general be called war planning. This embraced the prickly question of the relation of CIA to the military authorities in wartime -- such as the matter of establishing escape and evasion routes for US military personnel trapped behind the lines of a potential enemy, and the caching of arms, supplies, and communications

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equipment for agents or resistance groups behind the enemy lines. Such exercises were demanded by the military planners, who had romantic ideas about the feasibility and value of such activities. Dulles thought that they were a waste of time; in real life such plans, if the occasion arose, would bear little relationship to actual events. Hence he left this field to subordinates and would take almost any step to avoid having to become personally involved.

Dulles took another field of activity much more seriously, without having any taste for working hard at it himself -- this was the field of budgeting, fiscal controls, and accounting. He was insistent that the procedures had to be as strict and watertight as possible; he understood the vulnerability of an agency which handled large amounts of confidential funds. But he counted on his trusted lieutenants to concern themselves with the details, and he took them along to speak when details were needed.

With regard to those areas which were not of particular personal interest to Dulles, one fact must be borne in mind. It is a characteristic of a lawyer's

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training and experience that he has to be able on relatively short notice to bone up on a subject about which he knows little, absorb the salient features, foresee the type of questions that others may ask, and be prepared to answer those questions or to have on hand people who can answer them. Dulles not only had been trained as a lawyer; he had had many years of experience in the practice of law among colleagues of the highest caliber of competence. This experience and training were coupled with an agile mind and an extraordinary gift for convincing expression.

#### Dulles's Associates

To a large extent the many deputies and assistants whose roles are only slightly less important than that of the DCI will remain anonymous in this history, hidden behind the references to the activities of the Agency. Nevertheless, they were of major importance. One senior member of the organization, Desmond Fitzgerald, who rose to become DDP when Richard Helms became DDCI under Admiral Raborn, used to say that Dulles organized the Agency so that every function was covered by someone other than himself. This

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left him time and opportunity to meddle in any activity he chose. This was, said FitzGerald, good administration. This tongue-in-cheek description contains more than a grain of truth. Dulles was fascinated by certain aspects of clandestine operations, and there were many DDP operations in which he was virtually the case officer.

Dulles spent hundreds of hours in meetings with individuals whose subjects interested him or who, he thought, might be of some value to intelligence. If one remonstrated with him that he was wasting his time, he would frequently refer to the experience he had had in Switzerland in 1917. He had been told that a shabby Russian who was an important man was available to be seen. This was after hours and Dulles had a tennis engagement, so he refused to make the effort to see the shabby man. He later learned that the man was Lenin, who was in Switzerland before the Germans smuggled him into Russia.

Dulles could not have indulged in his propensity to involve himself in the minutiae of a political action operation if the essential activities of the

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Agency had not been covered by competent men. Probably the most important of these was his deputy, the late General Charles P. Cabell. After a varied career in the Air Corps and Air Force, Cabell became Director of Intelligence for the Air Force in 1948, and Director of the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1951. When Dulles became DCI in 1953, Cabell, then a Lieutenant General, became DDCI, following the tradition that a civilian DCI had a military deputy and vice versa.\* Cabell believed that his choice was largely the result of his being known as one of the few senior officers in the Armed Forces who believed in the concept of central intelligence and who had tried to make it work. Cabell had, of course, represented the Air Force in the IAC virtually from the time the National Security Act of 1947 was passed.

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\* General Cabell's selection was announced by President Eisenhower on 24 January 1953. The nomination was sent to the Senate on 10 April and approved on 20 April. In the meantime he was appointed Acting Deputy Director on 26 February. He was sworn in as DDCI on 23 April, was promoted to General on 11 July 1958, and served as DDCI until 31 January 1962, at which time he also retired from the Air Force.

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It is impossible to delineate the division of responsibility between Dulles and Cabell -- that is, what activities were primarily handled by each. Many of the internal housekeeping problems of the Agency such as personnel and security were primarily in Cabell's bailiwick, even though necessarily the ultimate responsibility was on Dulles. Much of the coordination of activities with the Pentagon was handled by the DDCI, but when major issues came to their critical phase, such as the working out of "agreed activities" or whether a community organ to deal with guided missiles (GMIC) should be set up, the DCI had to carry the ball. It is clear from the most superficial view of the Dulles years as DCI that the role of Cabell was of great importance; Dulles could not have operated as he did without the strong support he received from his Deputy. Cabell described his attitude towards the position of DDCI as that of a "co-pilot" who must be ready at all times to take over the pilot's responsibility for the plane. When Dulles went on his frequent long trips abroad, there was no hitch or slowing down of the apparatus; Cabell was on top of virtually all activities and took over

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with no repercussions.

Dulles was more than fortunate in his other senior deputies. During much of his incumbency, the Clandestine Services were under the control of Frank G. Wisner, the man who had been called on in 1947 by General George C. Marshall, the Secretary of State, and James Forrestal, the Secretary of Defense, to set up a service for covert action. The resulting organization, known as the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), became a part of CIG and then of CIA. In August 1952, after Dulles came to CIA, OPC was merged with the office of Special Operations (OSO) into the Clandestine Services under the Deputy Director for Plans. Wisner, who had remained as head of OPC, became DDP on 23 August 1951, when Dulles became General Smith's deputy. Wisner was an accomplished operator who understood the theory and practice of secret intelligence and had the confidence not only of Dulles but also of many other senior officers in the government whose work brought them into contact with clandestine operations. It was Wisner who made the Clandestine Services a going concern. He in turn could not have done so without the help of a large

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body of talented and dedicated assistants, most importantly his Chief of Operations, Richard Helms. Wisner had little talent for administration and it was Helms who kept the show running, handling the rambunctious, individualistic characters who made up the cast. The intensity of Wisner's involvement in his work, and the grueling schedule he kept, would have exhausted any man. In the winter of 1956 he had a very severe case of hepatitis, probably caught during a trip to Greece. It was a miracle that he survived the extraordinarily high fever that accompanied the disease, and his health -- mental as well as physical -- was permanently undermined. In 1957, he had a complete breakdown and was hospitalized for many months. During this period, his principal assistant, Helms, was acting DDP. By late 1958, it became clear that Wisner would not be able to resume the burdens of the DDP position. He was sent to London in 1959 as senior CIA representative, a post which he held during the remainder of Dulles's incumbency as DCI. In late 1961 he returned to Washington and retired officially on 31 August 1962. He had, however, never fully recovered from his earlier breakdown and had

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suffered a number of partial relapses. In 1965 he took his own life, a casualty of his intense devotion to his work in intelligence. No history of CIA, whether for the Dulles years or earlier, could be complete without a recognition of Wisner's important role in its development. The Clandestine Services were his creation. He organized them, charted their course, infused in them a sense of direction and purpose, and literally gave his life for them.

Wisner was succeeded as DDP by Richard M. Bissell, Jr. Bissell had been brought into CIA in February 1954 by Dulles as a special assistant available to handle special projects and to manage the Projects Review procedure under which all projects beyond a certain size were reviewed by a group representing all parts of the Agency.

Shortly after Bissell came on board he was put in charge of what became the U-2 project. The success of that operation was due more to the enthusiasm, competence, imagination, and management of Bissell than to any other factor. That was, however, by no means his sole responsibility and Dulles relied on him more

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and more in other fields. His extraordinary imagination, analytical brilliance, and versatility were so appealing to Dulles that he decided to make him DDP at the end of 1958\* to succeed Wisner, even though Dulles appreciated the experience and great professional competence of Helms. Dulles probably was afraid that he would lose Bissell if he did not make him DDP. Furthermore, some believe that Dulles saw Bissell as his potential successor as DCI and that he believed Bissell should have a full experience in the Clandestine Services to prepare him for that job. This may or may not have been true. Dulles was so engrossed in his work and so loved it that he is unlikely to have spent much time thinking about a successor.

The Clandestine Services contained a number of men of great competence. Cord Meyer, Kermit Roosevelt, Desmond FitzGerald, Thomas Karamessines, and Tracy Barnes are but a few of the extraordinary officers that made the Clandestine Services a highly competent

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\* Bissell was appointed DDP on 5 December 1958, effective 1 January 1959, and served until his resignation, effective 17 February 1962.

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secret service. Yet one cannot write a history of CIA in terms of these men. It was the leadership, the responsiveness, and the competence of Dulles that made their work possible.

In the rest of the Agency, there were men of equal competence and dedication. A key figure was Robert Amory, Jr., who served as DDI during almost the entire Dulles administration. Versatile, quick, articulate, and hard-working, he played a major role in the growth to competence of such organizations as the Office of Research and Reports (ORR) and the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI). One outstanding accomplishment was the building of an extraordinary competence in economic analysis in ORR. First-class men were hired (such as Edward W. Proctor, Edward L. Allen, Leo W. Sweeney, and Louis Marengo) and put under a chief who was a good administrator, Otto Guthe. Concentrating initially on the Soviet economy, ORR soon became so expert that its analytical competence became probably the best in the United States and its participation an essential ingredient of any valid study of Soviet military as well as civilian capabilities. The steps by which ORR gradually took

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over economic intelligence and analysis of non-Communist areas are treated elsewhere in this history.

Another area in which extraordinary competence was developed is that of scientific intelligence.

OSI, under the leadership of Dr. H. Marshall Chadwell (1950-55) and Herbert Scoville (1955-62), was able to recruit and engage the talents of a number of highly competent and imaginative officers. It was in connection with OSI's work that Cabell was particularly useful, since technical and scientific matters were not very congenial to Dulles.

The administrative, financial, and general support activities of the Agency were the basis on which its substantive work rested, and the smooth operation of these activities was the achievement of Colonel Lawrence K. White, who was the DCI's Deputy for Administration (later Support). An example is the matter of the new headquarters building. A proposal for a building was discussed when General Smith was DCI and tentative plans were made. But the putting through of the project -- obtaining the appropriation, choosing the site and the architects -- was Dulles's personal

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achievement. Nevertheless, the building might never have been built without the hard, detailed work of Colonel White and his deputy, H. Gates Lloyd. The inscription under the plaque of Dulles in the entrance hall of the building reads "His monument is around you" (an indifferent transformation of the epitaph to Sir Christopher Wren in St. Paul's Cathedral in London: "Si monumentum requiris, circumspice.") This is true and it is ironical that Dulles never had an office in the new building; it was completed shortly after he resigned. But it is equally true that the building is a monument to the support given by White and his organization.

An amusing sidelight would not be out of place. The cornerstone of the building was laid at an imposing ceremony on 3 November 1959. Taking part were President Eisenhower, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, senior members of Congress, and other dignitaries. After appropriate speeches, the cornerstone was set in place and the dignitaries used ceremonial trowels to smooth the mortar into which it was set. After the ceremony, the cornerstone was removed to safekeeping. The "mortar" had been a mixture of damp sand and sugar,

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which only looked like mortar. It was not Cream of Wheat, as was rumored.

Particular mention should be made of two more of Dulles's lieutenants. One was General Harold McClelland, who ran the Office of Communications. This organization developed the extraordinarily advanced equipment and designed the system which gave the Agency first-class communications for its overseas stations and highly sophisticated gear for clandestine operations. The other is Sherman Kent, who was Chairman of the Board of National Estimates (BNE) during all the Dulles years. Kent's book *Strategic Intelligence* is the classic on that subject and has been translated into a number of languages. As Chairman of the BNE, he developed the practical application of his theories; he harnessed with skill and good humor the talents of the varied and opinionated men who made up the Board and the extraordinarily competent staff of the Office of National Estimates (ONE), and he was more responsible than any other person for the development of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) into the valued apex of the intelligence structure. The NIE was circulated to the top echelon of

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government as the DCI's judgment. The other members of the intelligence community could then concur or dissent. The Director's competence and usefulness were on the line in the NIE. Dulles believed he was well served in the preparation of NIE's; it was only on rare occasions that he made changes in the drafts presented for his approval. This fact was not evidence of indifference or neglect on his part. Rather it was a testimonial to his confidence in and reliance on Kent.

Lawrence R. Houston was the General Counsel for the CIA (a post which he held from its earliest days and in 1973 still held) and as such was responsible for legal matters, including various legal actions in which the Agency was involved and legislation affecting the Agency. In addition, his role was that of a trusted advisor, particularly to Dulles. The records show innumerable occasions on which he was either the Agency spokesman or accompanied Dulles to important meetings, including those of the most delicate or high-level nature. His wide acquaintance in Washington and the high regard in which he was held by all who dealt with him made him an invaluable confidant and assistant.

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There was virtually no subject in the wide scope of Agency involvements to which he could not contribute relevant and valuable data out of his remarkable memory.

One more person must be mentioned -- Lyman B. Kirkpatrick. While his role in the Agency was not as important or successful as one would gather from his book, *The Real CIA*, 34/ nor commensurate with his ambitions (there is little doubt that he aspired to become DCI), he did play a significant role. Transcending the physical handicaps resulting from a serious bout of polio (1952-53) which left him a cripple, he served as Inspector General (IG) from 1 April 1953 throughout the rest of the Dulles administration. He fought for and won the right of the IG to inspect the Clandestine Services. He served as Chairman of the Career Service Board and was the focal point for dealing with external investigations of the Agency by the Clark Task Force of the Hoover Commission and by the Doolittle Committee. He was also the DCI's principal assistant in dealing with the PBCFIA and its successor under President Kennedy, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). He

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served as Chairman of the Joint Study Group in 1959-60 which surveyed the whole intelligence community and whose recommendations led indirectly to the creation of DIA. In these matters, he undoubtedly performed with competence and served Dulles and the Agency well.

The scandalous manner in which he handled the inspection of the Bay of Pigs operation, at the request of Dulles, and his inexcusable behavior in giving his survey to Dulles's prospective successor, John A. McCone, without having consulted Dulles or Cabell and without having shown his survey to Dulles, who was still the DCI, was, in the opinion of this writer, a manifestation of the consuming ambition which characterized many of his actions. He undoubtedly was trying to ingratiate himself with the next DCI. Furthermore, his survey indicted the clandestine Services for poor management and for not having coordinated the operations with other parts of the Agency or the policymakers. The point he was trying to make in the survey and in his handling of it was that a general manager in the Agency -- i.e., himself -- was needed. (Cabell agreed with the opinion of this writer, as did a number of other officers of CIA who

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were consulted.)\*

Mentioning only these few men is an injustice to the many competent officers who with dedication and skill gave Dulles the support and assistance which contributed so much to the success of his administration. But one must draw the line somewhere and can only plead that omission is in no way a denigration of their importance. Take, for example, John S. Earman who, as a personal assistant and later Executive Officer to Dulles (as he had been to Smith and was for a time to McCone), kept order in the front office, saw that Dulles was reminded of things he wanted to do, relayed his orders and decisions to other parts (and the correct parts) of the Agency, generally kept the business of the Director's office running, and arranged a manageable flow through the office of a Director who was not known for the efficiency or orderliness of his methods of work.

It should not be imagined that all was peace

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\* For further discussion of the IG survey on the Cuban operation, see Volume III, Chapter 3.

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and harmony among the principal officers in the Agency. No such group of high-powered people could coexist without friction; no organization with such a diverse number of functions as CIA and with such a high degree of compartmentation could avoid jurisdictional squabbles and tensions. Dulles not only was aware of this; he considered it something of an asset. He believed that rivalries, ambitions, and possessiveness were a stimulus to performance and a protection against complacency. So long as he was the head man and had, as he knew he had, the ability to soothe ruffled feelings and to keep an adequate measure of tranquility, he rather welcomed the existence of tensions.

It might be noted here that during these years the Agency still had a considerable element of the enthusiasm which comes from the exploration and development of new fields. The dead hand of bureaucracy had not, in most cases, descended; CIA was still proving itself. Nevertheless, because the Agency was largely insulated from the political forces which generally exist in Government departments, and because

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it did not have a set of superior officers who were changed with each change in national administration, it was vulnerable to getting set in its ways and to succumbing to bureaucratic rigidity. In this situation, a degree of tension and friction between components and between leading employees might well be valuable -- at least, Dulles thought so.

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## Chapter 2

Allen Dulles as Presidential Advisor

The extent to which a President makes use of a particular person as an advisor depends, of course, on the temperament and work habits of the President, and his personal relations with his potential advisor. There is little doubt that the relations between President Eisenhower and Dulles were friendly, easy, and cordial. The testimony of those individuals who were in a position to know (Mrs. Dulles, General Cabell, John S. Earman, Gordon Gray) is to this effect.

Dulles was often called in by the President as a member of a small group to discuss specific urgent foreign policy questions. While there is no direct record of the positive intelligence advice which Dulles provided to the President, there are records of instances in which he consulted with the President regarding covert action.\*

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\* See the discussion of policy guidance of covert action in Volume III, Chapter 1.

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Dulles usually performed his role as intelligence advisor at the weekly NSC meetings. The *modus operandi* of the Eisenhower administration was greatly affected by the President's military training and experience. The concept of intelligence briefings of staff meetings was carried over to the NSC. James S. Lay, who was the Executive Secretary of the NSC during the Eisenhower period, has written:

In accordance with a directive of the President in January 1953, one feature of every Council [NSC] meeting is an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence summarizing important developments that are occurring throughout the world. He gives particular attention to those areas which are on the Council agenda that day. 35/

Dulles took these briefings of the NSC seriously and prepared carefully for them. In general, he tried to include not only the latest intelligence on matters currently before the NSC, but also developments which he knew were of general interest to the members. For example, he often summarized new estimates on the Soviet military posture. He also included matters which he thought the NSC *should* be interested in. His presentations were carefully prepared with maps, charts,

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and other graphics as well as boards showing overhead photography.

The basic data for these briefings were largely prepared by a staff in OCI. The staff submitted material which it thought should be covered, including items which the DCI had requested as well as any recently collected information on subjects on the NSC agenda.

The day before an NSC meeting, Dulles met with the DDI, the AD/CI, area experts from OCI or other components of the Agency, and anyone else he considered useful. They went over the proposed briefing and Dulles asked for any elaboration he considered desirable. Just before the NSC meeting, OCI brought in any very late tidbits of information. Dulles often took with him to the NSC the expert or experts who could answer detailed questions.\*

In many cases, Dulles discussed with the US Intelligence Board (USIB)\*\* matters which he intended to

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\* The role of the DDI and OCI in these presentations is being treated in more detail in the histories of these organization units.

\*\* Before 15 September 1958, the functions of USIB were performed (footnote continued on following page)

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cover in his NSC briefings, sometimes asking other members to see what useful information they could give him. (It is an indication of the dearth of intelligence on Indochina in 1953 that Dulles could on 1 December ask "members to examine what firm intelligence is available respecting the existence of Ho Chi Minh."\* This was in connection with a projected NSC briefing. 36/)

There is virtually no evidence regarding the actual briefings.\*\* No formal minutes of the NSC meetings were kept, and attendance was strictly limited. Only the memories of the survivors of those who attended these meetings can be consulted. James S. Lay, Executive Secretary of the NSC, recalled that President Eisenhower

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by the IAC and the US Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB). On this date, with the issuance of NSCID 1 (Rev.), the IAC and USCIB were abolished and the USIB established. For purposes of simplicity, when the organization functioning at this echelon is discussed hereafter in a *general* sense (where the context does not require specific reference to the IAC or the USCIB), the term USIB is used.

\* Ho, who had been in the headlines for years, had dropped completely out of sight. Dulles thought that he might be dead and that his death was being concealed.

\*\* The briefing materials assembled by OCI have, however, been preserved in the CIA Records Center.

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obviously liked the briefings. The President's temperament and training were such that oral briefings were his preferred way of acquiring information. Lay also made the point that in the early days of the Eisenhower administration there were senior Government officials who had not had much exposure to foreign policy problems. Those that attended the NSC meetings found the briefings valuable and asked a good many questions. Lay noted that Dulles took particular pleasure in being able to present an interesting item which had been obtained by clandestine means.

Lay said that Dulles was careful to avoid taking part in discussions of policy except when he thought intelligence could make a contribution to the discussion, i.e. he took the limits of his role as the intelligence advisor seriously. As to the effectiveness of the briefings, this is probably a matter of the personal reactions of the audience. Lay does say that on a number of occasions after Dulles had mentioned a particular area in which he foresaw an increasing US interest, the President would comment that the NSC should review the existing written

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policy guidance (usually an NSC country policy paper) to see if it was up to date.

There were many occasions, according to Lay, when, after the formal adjournment of the NSC, Dulles and others accompanied the President into his office to discuss particularly sensitive matters. It is probable that the U-2 photography was handled this way in the early days.

Gordon Gray was present at a large proportion of NSC meetings during the Eisenhower years, first in support of Secretary of Defense Wilson (Gray was Assistant Secretary for ISA), then as Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, a statutory member of the NSC, and finally as the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. It is his opinion that Dulles's briefings were well handled, interested the President, and were valued by him. Gray thinks the President would have stopped them at once if he had not thought they were well worth the time and tended to establish a common body of fact and analysis as a foundation for foreign policy discussion.

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There were, of course, occasions when the intelligence judgments presented by Dulles were challenged. Gray recalls that in 1956, Dulles expressed the intelligence judgment that Nasser was firmly in control in Egypt and was the "wave of the future" there and in the Near East. The Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, took exception to this judgment, holding that Nasser could and should be overthrown and that US policy should be to promote that overthrow, rather than to try to ride along with Nasser. This policy recommendation was based on a view which was completely at variance with that of the intelligence community. (The Defense Department supported the view expressed by Allen Dulles.) Gray said that the President decided to "play it down the middle" (whatever that may mean). It is interesting that in 1957, Lyman B. Kirkpatrick records in his otherwise rather perfunctory diaries that General Cassidy, the Secretary of the President's Board of Consultants, told him on 19 March 1957 about an NSC discussion of procedures for policy guidance on covert operations under NSC 5412.\* 37/ Kirkpatrick wrote that

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\* For a discussion of policy guidance for covert operations under NSC 5412, see Volume III, Chapter 2.

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Foster Dulles had questioned whether he would have to go through all of that procedure. Foster went on to say that he and Allen were working on a plan to overthrow Nasser and didn't believe that others should be cut in. The President then said "don't you think you ought to tell me" which ended that particular discussion.

As has been said, each President had his own style of proceeding. It is clear that President Kennedy, when he took office, found not only the DCI briefings, but the whole formal structure of the Planning Board, the NSC and the OCB uncongenial. The briefings were discontinued, and, indeed, NSC meetings became sporadic instead of weekly.

CIA's part in the NSC process was by no means limited to the DCI's role as intelligence advisor at NSC meetings. The NSC was the body charged with the delineation of functions of both CIA and the intelligence community, as evidenced by the central role of the NSCID series of NSC directives. A special committee of the NSC composed of the Secretaries of State and Defense was the governing authority in the communications intelligence field. Organizational and coordinating problems which could not be resolved in the USIB were

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referred to the NSC for resolution. This referral was subject, in the case of a lack of unanimity among the services, to an intermediate referral to the Secretary of Defense. The basic charter for covert action was also set forth in a series of NSC directives.\*

In the foreign policy field during the Eisenhower years, there was another direct involvement (in addition to the DCI's role as a member of the OCB). In the highly structured NSC system which was characteristic of the Eisenhower administration, the responsibility for preparing drafts of proposed NSC policy papers was lodged in a subsidiary organization known as the NSC Planning Board. 38/ A representative of the DCI, who was in fact the DDI, was a member of this board. A great many of the NSC policy papers were known as "country papers," papers dealing with US policy towards a particular country. Frequently the first step in the process of preparing a draft was for the DDI, as the CIA representative on the Planning Board, or the NSC secretariat to request a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the country in question. The NSC had a

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\* See Volume III, Chapters 1 and 2.

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schedule reaching months into the future, and the lead time for estimates was thus long enough to permit carefully prepared contributions from the community. Here the DCI was directly involved, since, as has been said, the NIE's emerged from the USIB as the DCI's own estimates, with which other members of the USIB concurred or from which they dissented. Thus the DCI's estimates were in many cases the basis on which a policy paper was developed, and an estimate was often quoted or paraphrased in a policy paper. An accurate count has not been made, but it may well have been that numerically half the NIE's (not including the SNIE's) during the Eisenhower years were developed to meet (NSC) Planning Board requirements.

Another variation of the use by the policy makers of formal intelligence is found in the series of estimates, usually Special Estimates, on the probable consequences of certain US courses of action. 39/ Such estimates appear among the earliest produced; for example, in December 1950, NIE-12, entitled "Consequences of the Early Employment of Chinese Nationalist Forces in Korea," was published. The more usual type of title is found in SE-20 (22 December 1951), "The Probable Consequences of Certain Possible U.S.

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Courses of Action with respect to Communist China and Korea." (These courses included a UN embargo of shipments to China, a blockade of China, the bombing of Manchuria, etc.) Even a cursory examination of the list of estimates produced shows the variety of situations in which such a contingency estimate was requested: Inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO (SE-7, 15 June 1951), Indochina, Burma, and Thailand (SE-22, 4 March 1951), the overthrow of Albania (SE-34, 30 December 1952), retaking of Hainan by the Nationalist Chinese with US help (SE-30, 15 September 1953), adherence to the Baghdad Pact (SNIE-30-7-56, 6 November 1956), deployment of IRBM's on the Communist periphery (SNIE-100-4-58, 15 April 1958), the Antarctic (SNIE-11-3-58, 3 February 1958), and military intervention in Lebanon (SNIE-36.4-58, 5 June 1958).

During the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1954-58, estimates were produced, obviously by request, on at least 11 different occasions.\* The subjects of these

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\* 4 September 1954, 10 September 1954, 28 November 1954, 25 January 1955, 16 March 1955, 16 April 1955, 10 April 1956, 22 May 1956, 26 August 1958, 21 October 1958, and 28 October 1958.

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estimates were varied, but all contained intelligence judgments relevant to major foreign policy decisions. Between 11 July and 19 October 1961, six "probable reaction" estimates were published regarding courses of action in the then Berlin crisis (SNIE 2-61 through SNIE 2-6-61).

The whole elaborate NSC system was to a considerable extent abandoned with the onset of the Kennedy administration. While the transition was not abrupt, it soon became clear that the majestic staff organization was inconsistent with the temperament of the President and his advisers. Meetings of the NSC became irregular and more and more widely spaced. The NSC necessarily continued to exist; it was set up by a statute and its functions, including that of directing the CIA, remained on the books. The basic documents relating to intelligence organization and allocation of functions remained the NSCID's, and although the organizational framework within which the DCI functioned changed, Dulles's role as intelligence advisor to the President continued to be a significant one.

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## Appendix A

CHRONOLOGYAllen Welsh Dulles, Biographic Information

1893            7 April. Dulles born in Watertown, N.Y.

1914            Graduates from Princeton University, B.A.

1914-15        Makes trip around the world, teaching in India and China.

1916            Receives M.A. from Princeton; enters Foreign Service; is assigned to Vienna, Austria.

1917            Transferred to Bern, Switzerland.

1919            Member of US delegation to Versailles Peace Conference.

1921            Assigned to Constantinople, Turkey.

1922            Reassigned to Department, Chief of Near Eastern Division.


1926            Earns LL.B. from George Washington University; resigns from Foreign Service; becomes affiliated with law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell in New York City.

1928            Appointed legal advisor to US delegation to Geneva Naval Disarmament Conference.

1942            Recruited by Col. William Donovan to open New York office of OSS.

1943            Assigned to Bern, Switzerland, as head of OSS office.

1944            Assassination plot against Hitler. (See Dulles's *Germany's Underground* for his role.)

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- 1945 Negotiates surrender of German forces in Italy.  
(See Dulles's *Operation Sunrise* for his role.)  
Returns to law practice in New York.
- 1946 Serves as advisor to Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg,  
Director of Central Intelligence Group.
- 1947 Advisor to Adm. R. H. Hillenkoetter, Director  
of Central Intelligence Group; submits memo-  
randum on the desirability of centralized  
intelligence to Senate Armed Services Committee.
- 1948 Member of Dulles-Jackson-Correa group surveying  
CIA for President Truman and the NSC. Report  
dated 1 January 1949.
- 1950 Special Consultant to Gen. W. B. Smith, DCI.
- 1951 2 January appointed Deputy Director for Plans,  
CIA. 23 August appointed DDCI.

The Dulles Administration, 1953-1961

1953

- 20 Jan Gen. Eisenhower is inaugurated as President.
- 24 Jan Appointment of Dulles as DCI is announced.
- 10 Feb Nomination of Dulles is submitted to Senate.
- 23 Feb Senate confirms Dulles as DCI.
- 26 Feb Dulles is sworn in as DCI.
- 2 Mar Dulles first presides over IAC as DCI.
- 17 Mar First brush with Senator Joseph R. McCarthy.
- May First Photographic Intelligence (PI) unit is  
set up in ORR.
- 2 Sep Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) is established  
by E.O. 10483 (Dulles member).

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- 29 Jan Administrator of Civil Defense Administration requests estimate on Soviet ICBM's.
- 15 Feb Richard M. Bissell, Jr., is appointed Special Assistant to DCI for Planning and Coordination.
- 15 Mar NSC 5412 supersedes NSC 10/2 and NSC 10/5.
- 29 May ELINT program for CIA is approved.
- 1 Jul CIA is given responsibility for producing parts of NIS program dealing with Soviet economics and health and sanitation.
- 26 Jul Eisenhower sets up Doolittle Committee to survey CIA Clandestine Services.
- 30 Sep Doolittle Committee reports to Eisenhower.
- 27 Oct Clark Task Force is set up by Hoover Commission.

1955

- 14 Jan Mansfield resolution for a Watchdog Committee to supervise CIA is introduced in Senate.
- 10 Mar Eisenhower letter establishes Planning Coordination Group in OCB (Dulles a member).
- 12 Mar NSC 5412/1 amends NSC 5412.
- Watch Committee and National Indications Center get under way.
- IAC approves Committee on Formosa Straits; first daily report, 21 March.
- May Report of Clark Task Force of Hoover Commission is issued.
- 16 May NSCID 17 on ELINT policy goes into effect.

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- 19 Jul Last appearance of Gen. Trudeau in IAC.
- 5 Oct Karamanlis becomes Prime Minister of Greece.
- 23 Dec Dulles sends memo to SecDef Wilson recommending formation of GMIC.
- 28 Dec NSC 5412/2 amends NSC 5412/1 and abolishes Planning Coordination Group.

1956

- 9 Jan SecDef approves setting up of GMIC.
- 13 Jan Eisenhower establishes President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA).
- 31 Jan GMIC set up.
- 11 Apr Mansfield resolution for Watchdog Committee defeated in Senate, 59-27.
- 8 Jun IAC discusses release of Khrushchev's speech at XX Soviet Party Congress.
- Jul First U-2 photographs available.
- 20 Dec PBCFIA makes initial report to Eisenhower.

1957

- 2 Mar Eisenhower issues annex to NSC 5412/2.
- Sep *Studies in Intelligence* started.

1958

- 18 Jan Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIB) inaugurated.

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- 21 Apr NSCID 3 gives CIA primary responsibility for economic intelligence on Sino-Soviet Bloc.
- 22 Apr IAC discusses with NSC representatives merger of IAC and USCIB.
- Jul CRITIC system of crisis communications goes into operation.
- 6 Aug Senator Symington visits Dulles to discuss Soviet ICBM strength.
- 15 Sep NSC completes action for merger of IAC and USCIB into USIB.
- 15 Sep New NSCID 1 makes DCI responsible for development of policies and procedures for the protection of intelligence and intelligence sources and methods.

1959

- 3 Feb GMIC becomes GMAIC (adding astronautics).
- 24 Mar USIB sets up Security Committee (DCID 1/11).
- 24 May John Foster Dulles dies.
- 3 Nov Cornerstone of New CIA Building in Langley is laid.

1960

- 29 Jan Dulles testifies before Senate Committees on Soviet ICBM program (second appearance 24 Feb.).
- 17 Mar Eisenhower approves planning paper on Operations to overthrow Castro.

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- 1 May U-2 piloted by Gary Powers comes down in USSR.
- Jun Dulles appears before Congressional Committees re U-2.
- Sep NSA employees Martin and Mitchell defect to USSR.
- 10 Nov President-elect Kennedy announces Dulles will remain as DCI.
- 18 Nov Dulles and R. M. Bissell brief President-elect Kennedy on covert operations, including Cuba.

1961

- 20 Jan John F. Kennedy is inaugurated as President.
- 18 Feb OCB abolished by E.O. 10920.
- Mar Department of State gives up all responsibility for contributions to NIS.
- 16 Apr Landing at Bay of Pigs in Cuba.
- 13 Jun Gen. Maxwell Taylor reports to President on Cuban Operation.
- 1 Jul CIA is given responsibility for all non-military biographical intelligence.
- 25 Jul USIB agrees to merge ELINT and COMINT committees.
- 31 Aug DIA is formed.
- 27 Sep President Kennedy announces John A. McCone as next DCI.
- 28 Sep Dulles informs USIB that he will retire.
- 10 Oct DIA first appearance at USIB.

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- 19 Oct: USIB meets in new CIA building.
- 20 Nov L. B. Kirkpatrick delivers IG report on Cuban Operations to McCone.
- 28 Nov Dulles is awarded National Security Medal by President Kennedy at CIA Headquarters.
- 29 Nov Dulles retires.

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## Appendix B

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10. Wayne G. Jackson, correspondence with William H. Jackson, Dec 69; and Wayne G. Jackson, conversations with Montague, 1969 and 1970.
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12. Montague, interview with Souers (1, above).
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16. *New York Times*, 18 Mar 53, 19:7.
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22. *Ibid.*, 19 Jul 53, IV, 9:1.
23. *Ibid.*, 11 Jul 53, 7:1.
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27. *Ibid.*, 7 Jul 54, 9:5.
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